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Report X509_VERIFY_PARAM hostname/IP mismatches to the verify callback so applications can inspect or override them #11156

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Report X509_VERIFY_PARAM hostname/IP mismatches to the verify callback so applications can inspect or override them #11156

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67 changes: 40 additions & 27 deletions src/x509_str.c
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1193,6 +1193,46 @@ int wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert(WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX* ctx)
ret = X509StoreCheckPathLen(ctx);
}

/* Enforce hostname / IP verification from X509_VERIFY_PARAM if set.
* Always check against the leaf (end-entity) certificate, captured in
* orig before the chain-building loop modified ctx->current_cert.
*
* A mismatch is reported to the application verify callback the way
* OpenSSL's check_id_error() does: record error, error_depth and
* current_cert, then call it with ok=0, and let a return of 1 override.
* Without that call a callback installed to inspect or override
* verification errors never sees a hostname or IP mismatch. */
if (ctx->param != NULL) {
WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb idVerifyCb =
X509StoreGetVerifyCb(ctx);

if (ret == WOLFSSL_SUCCESS && ctx->param->hostName[0] != '\0') {
if (wolfSSL_X509_check_host(orig,
ctx->param->hostName,
XSTRLEN(ctx->param->hostName),
ctx->param->hostFlags, NULL) != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) {
ctx->error = WOLFSSL_X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->current_cert = orig;
if (idVerifyCb == NULL || idVerifyCb(0, ctx) != 1) {
ret = WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
}
}
}
if (ret == WOLFSSL_SUCCESS && ctx->param->ipasc[0] != '\0') {
if (wolfSSL_X509_check_ip_asc(orig,
ctx->param->ipasc,
ctx->param->hostFlags) != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) {
ctx->error = WOLFSSL_X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->current_cert = orig;
if (idVerifyCb == NULL || idVerifyCb(0, ctx) != 1) {
ret = WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
}
}
}
}

exit:
/* Copy back failed certs. */
numFailedCerts = wolfSSL_sk_X509_num(failedCerts);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1253,33 +1293,6 @@ int wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert(WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX* ctx)
wolfSSL_sk_X509_free(origTrustedSk);
}

/* Enforce hostname / IP verification from X509_VERIFY_PARAM if set.
* Always check against the leaf (end-entity) certificate, captured in
* orig before the chain-building loop modified ctx->current_cert. */
if (ctx->param != NULL) {
if (ret == WOLFSSL_SUCCESS && ctx->param->hostName[0] != '\0') {
if (wolfSSL_X509_check_host(orig,
ctx->param->hostName,
XSTRLEN(ctx->param->hostName),
ctx->param->hostFlags, NULL) != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) {
ctx->error = WOLFSSL_X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->current_cert = orig;
ret = WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
}
}
if (ret == WOLFSSL_SUCCESS && ctx->param->ipasc[0] != '\0') {
if (wolfSSL_X509_check_ip_asc(orig,
ctx->param->ipasc,
ctx->param->hostFlags) != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) {
ctx->error = WOLFSSL_X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->current_cert = orig;
ret = WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
}
}
}

/* Fail closed on the way out: every failure has to be reportable through
* X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(), or the application is told the chain was
* fine while this function reports failure. Not all of them record one -
Expand Down
104 changes: 104 additions & 0 deletions tests/api/test_ossl_x509_str.c
View file
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1369,6 +1369,110 @@ int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb(void)
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}

#if defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA) && !defined(NO_CERTS) && !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM) && \
!defined(NO_RSA) && !defined(NO_ASN_TIME) && !defined(NO_ASN)
/* Records every rejecting invocation and the error it carried, then accepts,
* the way an application overriding a verification error does. */
static int checkid_cb_rejects = 0;
static int checkid_cb_error = 0;
static int checkid_override_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX* ctx)
{
if (ok == 0) {
checkid_cb_rejects++;
checkid_cb_error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
}
return 1; /* accept */
}
#endif

/* A hostname or IP mismatch from X509_VERIFY_PARAM must be reported to the
* verify callback with ok=0, and the callback's acceptance must override it,
* as OpenSSL's check_id_error() does. */
int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb_check_id(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
#if defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA) && !defined(NO_CERTS) && !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM) && \
!defined(NO_RSA) && !defined(NO_ASN_TIME) && !defined(NO_ASN)
X509* ca = NULL;
X509* leaf = NULL;
X509_STORE* store = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX* ctx = NULL;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM* param = NULL;

ExpectNotNull(ca = test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex_helper(
"./certs/ca-cert.pem"));
/* server-cert.pem carries SAN DNS:example.com and IP:127.0.0.1. */
ExpectNotNull(leaf = test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex_helper(
"./certs/server-cert.pem"));
ExpectNotNull(store = X509_STORE_new());
ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, ca), 1);

/* Sanity check: with a matching hostname the chain verifies and the
* callback is never handed a rejection. */
checkid_cb_rejects = 0;
checkid_cb_error = 0;
ExpectNotNull(ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, NULL), 1);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, checkid_override_cb);
ExpectNotNull(param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx));
ExpectIntEQ(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, "example.com", 0), 1);
ExpectIntEQ(X509_verify_cert(ctx), 1);
ExpectIntEQ(checkid_cb_rejects, 0);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
param = NULL;

/* Same chain, mismatching hostname: the callback must see ok=0 with
* X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, and its acceptance must stand. */
checkid_cb_rejects = 0;
checkid_cb_error = 0;
ExpectNotNull(ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, NULL), 1);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, checkid_override_cb);
ExpectNotNull(param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx));
ExpectIntEQ(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, "not-example.com", 0), 1);
ExpectIntEQ(X509_verify_cert(ctx), 1);
ExpectIntEQ(checkid_cb_rejects, 1);
ExpectIntEQ(checkid_cb_error, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
param = NULL;

#ifdef WOLFSSL_IP_ALT_NAME
/* Mismatching IP: same contract, with X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH. */
checkid_cb_rejects = 0;
checkid_cb_error = 0;
ExpectNotNull(ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, NULL), 1);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, checkid_override_cb);
ExpectNotNull(param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx));
ExpectIntEQ(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(param, "10.0.0.1"), 1);
ExpectIntEQ(X509_verify_cert(ctx), 1);
ExpectIntEQ(checkid_cb_rejects, 1);
ExpectIntEQ(checkid_cb_error, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
param = NULL;
#endif /* WOLFSSL_IP_ALT_NAME */

/* With no callback installed the mismatch must still fail closed and stay
* reportable through get_error(). */
ExpectNotNull(ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, NULL), 1);
ExpectNotNull(param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx));
ExpectIntEQ(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, "not-example.com", 0), 1);
ExpectIntNE(X509_verify_cert(ctx), 1);
ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx), X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH);

X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
X509_STORE_free(store);
X509_free(leaf);
X509_free(ca);
#endif /* OPENSSL_EXTRA && !NO_CERTS && !NO_FILESYSTEM && !NO_RSA &&
* !NO_ASN_TIME && !NO_ASN */
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}

/* The trust anchor's own pathLenConstraint must bound the path (matching
* OpenSSL's -partial_chain behavior and wolfSSL's native ParseCertRelative).
* Trust chainF-ICA2 (pathlen:0) directly as a partial-chain anchor and verify
Expand Down
3 changes: 3 additions & 0 deletions tests/api/test_ossl_x509_str.h
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ int test_wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert_pathlen_override(void);
int test_wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert_pathlen_override_ctx_cb(void);
int test_wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert_pathlen_anchor(void);
int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb(void);
int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb_check_id(void);
int test_X509_verify_cert_untrusted_inter(void);
int test_X509_verify_cert_ca_no_keycertsign(void);
int test_X509_STORE_untrusted(void);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -75,6 +76,8 @@ int test_wolfSSL_CTX_set_cert_store(void);
test_wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert_pathlen_anchor), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509_store", \
test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509_store", \
test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb_check_id), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509_store", test_X509_verify_cert_untrusted_inter), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509_store", \
test_X509_verify_cert_ca_no_keycertsign), \
Expand Down
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