chore(ci): pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs for supply chain security#669
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bhabalan wants to merge 1 commit intowebex:nextfrom
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chore(ci): pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs for supply chain security#669bhabalan wants to merge 1 commit intowebex:nextfrom
bhabalan wants to merge 1 commit intowebex:nextfrom
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Pin all GitHub Action references to immutable commit SHAs instead of mutable version tags. This prevents a class of supply chain attacks where an attacker force-pushes a tag to point at malicious code (as seen in the recent Trivy/TeamPCP incident, March 2026).
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COMPLETES N/A — proactive security hardening
This pull request addresses
The recent Trivy supply chain attack (March 2026, TeamPCP/DeadCatx3) demonstrated that mutable GitHub Action version tags can be force-pushed to point at malicious code. Any CI/CD pipeline referencing actions by tag (e.g.,
actions/checkout@v4) would silently execute the attacker's payload. While this repo was not directly affected (no Trivy usage), all three workflow files used mutable version tags for GitHub Actions, leaving them vulnerable to the same class of attack.by making the following changes
Pin all GitHub Action
uses:references to immutable commit SHAs across all three workflow files, with the version tag preserved as an inline comment for readability:pull-request.yml— pinnedactions/checkout@v3,actions/setup-node@v4,actions/cache@v4,actions/upload-artifact@v4deploy.yml— pinnedactions/checkout@v4,actions/setup-node@v4,actions/cache@v4,actions/cache/restore@v4,actions/cache/save@v4update-dependencies.yml— pinnedactions/checkout@v2Change Type
The following scenarios were tested
The GAI Coding Policy And Copyright Annotation Best Practices
Checklist before merging