vmfunc · TBX3D · Jul 8, 2026
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+package modules_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/vmfunc/sif/internal/modules"
+)
+
+const (
+	crlfModule = "../../modules/http/crlf-injection.yaml"
+	ssiModule  = "../../modules/http/ssi-injection.yaml"
+)
+
+func runInjectionModule(t *testing.T, file string, h http.Handler) *modules.Result {
+	t.Helper()
+	def, err := modules.ParseYAMLModule(file)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse %s: %v", file, err)
+	}
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(h)
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	res, err := modules.ExecuteHTTPModule(context.Background(), srv.URL, def, modules.Options{
+		Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
+		Threads: 4,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("execute %s: %v", file, err)
+	}
+	return res
+}
+
+// crlfHandler simulates a server that reflects request-supplied values into the
+// response header block. When sanitize is false it splits any value on CR/LF and
+// promotes trailing "Key: Value" lines to real headers, reproducing response
+// splitting. When sanitize is true it strips CR/LF first, so no header materializes.
+func crlfHandler(sanitize bool) http.HandlerFunc {
+	newline := regexp.MustCompile(`\r\n|\r|\n`)
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		var vals []string
+		for _, vv := range r.URL.Query() {
+			vals = append(vals, vv...)
+		}
+		vals = append(vals, r.URL.Path)
+
+		for _, v := range vals {
+			if sanitize {
+				v = strings.NewReplacer("\r", "", "\n", "").Replace(v)
+			}
+			segs := newline.Split(v, -1)
+			if len(segs) < 2 {
+				continue
+			}
+			for _, seg := range segs[1:] {
+				idx := strings.Index(seg, ":")
+				if idx <= 0 {
+					continue
+				}
+				w.Header().Set(strings.TrimSpace(seg[:idx]), strings.TrimSpace(seg[idx+1:]))
+			}
+		}
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
+	}
+}
+
+// ssiHandler simulates SSI processing of reflected input. When render is true it
+// replaces an echo directive with a live GMT date (as Apache mod_include would),
+// consuming the directive. When render is false it echoes the value literally.
+func ssiHandler(render bool) http.HandlerFunc {
+	directive := regexp.MustCompile(`<!--#echo var="[A-Z_]+"-->`)
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		v := r.URL.Query().Get("q")
+		if render {
+			v = directive.ReplaceAllString(v, "Wednesday, 08-Jul-2026 14:30:00 GMT")
+		}
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte("<html><body>" + v + "</body></html>"))
+	}
+}
+
+// ssiEntityHandler reflects the decoded value but HTML-encodes the metacharacters
+// with NUMERIC character references ("<" -> "&#60;"). This is the adversarial
+// case: the escape itself carries digits with no literal "<", which a naive
+// "[^<]*\d[^<]*" regex would wrongly match.
+func ssiEntityHandler() http.HandlerFunc {
+	rep := strings.NewReplacer("<", "&#60;", ">", "&#62;", "\"", "&#34;")
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte("<html><body>" + rep.Replace(r.URL.Query().Get("q")) + "</body></html>"))
+	}
+}
+
+// ssiRawHandler reflects the RAW (still percent-encoded) query value, as an app
+// that echoes the query string verbatim would ("no results for %3C..."). The
+// "%3C" escapes carry digits with no literal "<".
+func ssiRawHandler() http.HandlerFunc {
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		raw := r.URL.RawQuery
+		if i := strings.IndexByte(raw, '='); i >= 0 {
+			raw = raw[i+1:]
+		}
+		if i := strings.IndexByte(raw, '&'); i >= 0 {
+			raw = raw[:i]
+		}
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte("<html><body>no results for " + raw + "</body></html>"))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCRLFInjectionModule(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("injected header materializes", func(t *testing.T) {
+		res := runInjectionModule(t, crlfModule, crlfHandler(false))
+		if len(res.Findings) == 0 {
+			t.Fatal("expected a crlf finding when the injected header is reflected")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("sanitized response is not flagged", func(t *testing.T) {
+		res := runInjectionModule(t, crlfModule, crlfHandler(true))
+		if len(res.Findings) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("got %d findings on a sanitizing server, want 0", len(res.Findings))
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("body-only reflection is not flagged", func(t *testing.T) {
+		echo := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(r.URL.RawQuery))
+		})
+		res := runInjectionModule(t, crlfModule, echo)
+		if len(res.Findings) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("got %d findings on body-only reflection, want 0", len(res.Findings))
+		}
+	})
+
+	// a non-splitting server that echoes the param into an unrelated header
+	// value: go collapses the CR/LF so no header line is added, but the literal
+	// "X-Sif-Injected" text survives inside that value. a line-anchored matcher
+	// must not treat that mid-line text as an injected header.
+	t.Run("header-value reflection is not flagged", func(t *testing.T) {
+		reflect := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			for _, vv := range r.URL.Query() {
+				for _, v := range vv {
+					w.Header().Set("X-Echo-Request", v)
+				}
+			}
+			_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
+		})
+		res := runInjectionModule(t, crlfModule, reflect)
+		if len(res.Findings) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("got %d findings on header-value reflection, want 0", len(res.Findings))
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestSSIInjectionModule(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("rendered directive is flagged", func(t *testing.T) {
+		res := runInjectionModule(t, ssiModule, ssiHandler(true))
+		if len(res.Findings) == 0 {
+			t.Fatal("expected an ssi finding when the echo directive renders a date")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("literal echo is not flagged", func(t *testing.T) {
+		res := runInjectionModule(t, ssiModule, ssiHandler(false))
+		if len(res.Findings) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("got %d findings when the directive is echoed literally, want 0", len(res.Findings))
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("numeric-entity reflection is not flagged", func(t *testing.T) {
+		res := runInjectionModule(t, ssiModule, ssiEntityHandler())
+		if len(res.Findings) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("got %d findings on numeric-entity reflection, want 0", len(res.Findings))
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("raw percent reflection is not flagged", func(t *testing.T) {
+		res := runInjectionModule(t, ssiModule, ssiRawHandler())
+		if len(res.Findings) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("got %d findings on raw percent-encoded reflection, want 0", len(res.Findings))
+		}
+	})
+
+	// literal reflection plus a digit elsewhere on the page: the "<" of the
+	// echoed directive sits between the markers, so no cross-sentinel match.
+	t.Run("reflection with unrelated digit is not flagged", func(t *testing.T) {
+		h := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			_, _ = w.Write([]byte("<p>page 7</p>" + r.URL.Query().Get("q")))
+		})
+		res := runInjectionModule(t, ssiModule, h)
+		if len(res.Findings) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("got %d findings on reflection beside an unrelated digit, want 0", len(res.Findings))
+		}
+	})
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# CRLF Injection / HTTP Response Splitting Detection Module
+
+id: crlf-injection
+info:
+  name: CRLF Injection Detection
+  author: sif
+  severity: medium
+  description: Detects CRLF injection and HTTP response splitting via header reflection
+  tags: [crlf, injection, response-splitting, owasp-top10]
+
+type: http
+
+http:
+  method: GET
+  paths:
+    - "{{BaseURL}}/?url={{payload}}"
+    - "{{BaseURL}}/?redirect={{payload}}"
+    - "{{BaseURL}}/?next={{payload}}"
+    - "{{BaseURL}}/?page={{payload}}"
+    - "{{BaseURL}}/?dest={{payload}}"
+    - "{{BaseURL}}/?r={{payload}}"
+    - "{{BaseURL}}/{{payload}}"
+
+  payloads:
+    - "%0d%0aX-Sif-Injected:1"
+    - "%0d%0aX-Sif-Injected%3A1"
+    - "%0aX-Sif-Injected:1"
+    - "test%0d%0aX-Sif-Injected:1"
+
+  threads: 10
+
+  # proof: anchor to a header LINE that starts with our injected key. a real
+  # split promotes "X-Sif-Injected:1" to its own header line; reflecting the
+  # payload into some other header's VALUE (go rewrites the CR/LF to nothing, so
+  # no split) leaves the text mid-line, where "^" cannot match. getPart renders
+  # one "Key: value" per line, so line-start distinguishes split from reflection.
+  matchers:
+    - type: regex
+      part: header
+      regex:
+        - "(?m)^X-Sif-Injected:"
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# Server-Side Includes (SSI) Injection Detection Module
+
+id: ssi-injection
+info:
+  name: Server-Side Includes Injection Detection
+  author: sif
+  severity: high
+  description: Detects Server-Side Includes injection via directive evaluation
+  tags: [ssi, injection, server-side-includes]
+
+type: http
+
+http:
+  method: GET
+  paths:
+    - "{{BaseURL}}/?q={{payload}}"
+    - "{{BaseURL}}/?search={{payload}}"
+    - "{{BaseURL}}/?name={{payload}}"
+    - "{{BaseURL}}/?page={{payload}}"
+    - "{{BaseURL}}/?comment={{payload}}"
+    - "{{BaseURL}}/?msg={{payload}}"
+
+  # the echo directive carries no digit, so a digit appearing between our two
+  # markers can only come from a rendered date. the payload is wrapped so the
+  # value is url-safe on the wire and the server decodes it before evaluation.
+  payloads:
+    - "SIFSSIA%3C!--%23echo%20var%3D%22DATE_GMT%22--%3ESIFSSIZ"
+    - "SIFSSIA%3C!--%23echo%20var%3D%22DATE_LOCAL%22--%3ESIFSSIZ"
+
+  threads: 10
+
+  # proof: a digit must sit between the markers with no "<", "&" or "%" between
+  # them. the directive carries no digit of its own, so every digit-bearing
+  # reflection reaches us through an escape that our excluded set blocks: literal
+  # ("<"), html entity named or numeric ("&lt;", "&#60;" -> "&"), or raw percent
+  # ("%3C" -> "%"). a rendered GMT date has none of those, so only genuine SSI
+  # evaluation (the directive replaced by a date) can satisfy this regex.
+  matchers:
+    - type: regex
+      part: body
+      regex:
+        - "SIFSSIA[^<&%]*\\d[^<&%]*SIFSSIZ"