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The current project configuration supports at most node 18.x so setting lts/hydrogen as the version to be used.
The project is on OpenZeppelin 4 and the latest version currently available is 4.9.6. This change will also allow us to use Ownable2StepUpgradeable that was not available in OpenZeppelin 4.6. The upgrade required increasing the version of @openzeppelin/hardhat-upgrades plugin given the bug in the previously used 1.20.0 version not resolving the correct version of dependencies used (OZ contracts vs contracts-upgradeable) and in our case complaining about the delegatecall used in the OZ's AddressUpgradeable code. The bug was fixed in 1.20.4 version of the plugin. This also required updates in the deployment tests as some functions are no longer available in the upgraded version. https://forum.openzeppelin.com/t/interacting-with-uups-upgradeable-contracts-in-test-throwing-contract-is-not-upgrade-safe-use-of-delegatecall-is-not-allowed/32743/5
The allowlist contract replaces the Threshold `TokenStaking` contract and is as an outcome of TIP-092 and TIP-100 governance decisions. Staking tokens is no longer required to operate nodes. Beta stakers are selected by the DAO and operate the network based on the allowlist maintained by the DAO. The contract will be integrated with the `WalletRegistry` and replace calls to `TokenStaking`. I have been experimenting with various approaches, and the most extreme one was to remove most of the `EcdsaAuthorization` logic as well as all `TokenStaking.seize` calls. This would have cascading effects on tBTC Bridge contracts as they rely on `WalletRegistry.seize`. That would also require implementing weight decrease delays in the `Allowlist,` so essentially doing work that is already done in `WalletRegistry`. Considering the pros and cons, I decided on the least invasive option. The `WalletRegistry` still thinks in terms of stake authorization, but everything is based on the staking provider's weight as set in the `Allowlist`, and weight decrease delays are enforced by the existing mechanism in `EcdsaAuthorization`. The `seize` function does nothing except of emitting an event about detecting beta staker misbehavior. This code is still a draft. Has to be integrated and covered with proper tests!
piotr-roslaniec
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Aug 4, 2025
Fixes PR #3826 by implementing missing components for Allowlist contract: - Add comprehensive test suite (432 lines, full coverage) - Create deployment script with upgradeable proxy pattern - Add migration script to initialize existing beta staker weights - Complete documentation with deployment and consolidation guides - Add one-click consolidation script based on authoritative research - Consolidates 18 operators → 3 operators (83% reduction) - Keeps 1 operator per entity (Boar, P2P, Staked) - Natural fund drainage through weight management (no forced migrations) - DAO-controlled operator management without token staking - Gradual, reversible consolidation process - Complete audit trails and safety checks - Production-ready deployment infrastructure This enables the transition from TokenStaking to Allowlist as specified in TIP-092 and TIP-100, with a direct path to beta staker consolidation.
- Add Allowlist contract to replace TokenStaking per TIP-092/TIP-100 - Implement weight-based operator management without token staking - Add deployment and initialization scripts - Include consolidation script for operator reduction (20→4 operators) - Includes NUCO operators (1 kept, 1 consolidated) - Add comprehensive test coverage - Maintain compatibility with existing WalletRegistry interface
- Add two-step process enforcement for weight decrease (Issue #1) - Introduce decreasePending flag to track valid decrease requests - Prevent bypassing the intended authorization flow - Add zero address validation (Issue #3) - Validate walletRegistry in initialize() - Validate stakingProvider in addStakingProvider() - Add zero weight validation (Issue #5) - Prevent adding staking providers with zero weight - Avoid potential duplicate additions - Add comprehensive test coverage for all security fixes Note: Issue #8 (seize function access) intentionally not restricted as public reporting of malicious behavior is desired functionality
…r handling Reduce contract size by removing DkgMaliciousResultSlashingFailed event and simplifying try-catch block in challengeDkgResult function. This optimization follows the pattern from commit 412a8e6 to meet bytecode size constraints. Changes: - Remove DkgMaliciousResultSlashingFailed event definition from WalletRegistry and all test upgrade contracts (V2, V2MissingSlot, V2MisplacedNewSlot) - Simplify challengeDkgResult try-catch: empty catch block allows silent slashing failure while ensuring challenge always completes - Add clear documentation explaining bytecode optimization trade-offs - Fix deployment script issues: add func.id to 15_deploy_allowlist.ts and Array.from() iteration in 16_initialize_allowlist_weights.ts - Add comprehensive test coverage with 11 new tests validating both success and failure paths for DKG challenge with simplified error handling Results: - WalletRegistry contract size: 24.115 KB (under 24.576 KB Spurious Dragon limit) - All 54 tests passing (20s execution time) - No regressions in TD-2 security audit fixes - Challenge completion preserved regardless of slashing outcome This optimization is the first step toward meeting the <22KB bytecode target for the WalletRegistry contract while maintaining all critical functionality and security guarantees.
Remove the EOA-only restriction from WalletRegistry.challengeDkgResult to enable compatibility with EIP-7702 (delegated code execution). This allows accounts with delegated code to participate in DKG result challenges while maintaining gas manipulation protection through the existing requireChallengeExtraGas mechanism. Changes: - Remove msg.sender == tx.origin check from challengeDkgResult - Add EIP-7702 compatibility documentation - Update test to validate contract caller challenge scenarios - Reduce bytecode size by ~150 bytes Gas manipulation protection remains enforced via the existing requireChallengeExtraGas function, which is independent of caller type and provides robust protection against gas limit attacks per EIP-150.
Reduce WalletRegistry contract size by 289 bytes through strategic bytecode optimizations to meet EIP-170 24KB deployment limit. Changes: - Inline requireChallengeExtraGas() function at single call site - Consolidate DKG setter state validation in updateDkgParameters - Optimize error message strings for brevity - Add technical comments explaining optimizations Files modified: - contracts/WalletRegistry.sol: Consolidated state check, inlined gas validation - contracts/libraries/EcdsaDkg.sol: Removed function, simplified setters, optimized errors - contracts/test/upgrades/WalletRegistryV2*.sol: Updated test upgrade contracts Results: - Bytecode reduced from 24.058 KB to 23.769 KB (289 bytes saved) - Contract now 237 bytes under 24KB limit - Zero compiler warnings - All validation logic preserved
Implement dual-mode modifier supporting both Allowlist and legacy TokenStaking authorization paths to enable gradual migration while maintaining backward compatibility. Changes: - Add allowlist state variable with comprehensive documentation - Update onlyStakingContract modifier with precedence logic: - Allowlist takes precedence when set (non-zero address) - Falls back to legacy staking when allowlist is zero - Add initializeV2 function for proxy upgrade with reinitializer(2) - Include gas optimization via address caching in modifier - Add comprehensive test suite (19 tests, 100% passing) The implementation preserves all existing security fixes and maintains backward compatibility with current deployments. Gas overhead is minimal (<0.5% increase).
Replace all require() statements with custom error reverts to improve gas efficiency and error clarity in the WalletRegistry contract. Changes: - Added 13 custom error definitions for authorization, validation, state, and configuration errors - Converted all require() statements to conditional revert with custom errors - Updated modifiers (onlyStakingContract, onlyWalletOwner, onlyReimbursableAdmin) to use custom errors - Updated test suites to expect custom error messages instead of string messages Benefits: - Reduced gas costs for error handling - More precise error identification and debugging - Improved code maintainability and readability
Update test assertions to match custom error format following the require-to-custom-error refactoring. Add comprehensive custom error validation test suite. Changes: - Replace string error messages with custom error names in Slashing tests - Replace string error messages with custom error names in Wallets tests - Add new WalletRegistry.CustomErrors.test.ts for comprehensive validation - Authorization errors (CallerNotStakingContract, CallerNotWalletOwner, etc.) - Validation errors (InvalidWalletMembersIdentifiers, NotSortitionPoolOperator, etc.) - State errors (CurrentStateNotIdle, NotEnoughExtraGasLeft) This completes the custom error migration by ensuring all tests validate the new error format consistently.
Introduce a comprehensive audit briefing for the WalletRegistry contract, detailing optimizations made for EIP-170 compliance. The document outlines the project's scope, executive summary, changes made, and trade-offs accepted during the optimization process. Key highlights include the reduction of contract bytecode to 23.824 KB, the implementation of dual-mode authorization, and the migration to custom error handling for improved gas efficiency. The document serves as a guide for auditors, emphasizing areas of focus and known issues related to the recent changes.
…nt authorization routing Security Critical Changes: - Add onlyGovernance modifier to WalletRegistry.initializeV2() to prevent front-running attacks during allowlist initialization - Implement _currentAuthorizationSource() helper to enable conditional authorization routing during TIP-092 migration period Authorization Routing Implementation: - Route authorization queries to Allowlist when set, TokenStaking otherwise - Update 6 callsites: joinSortitionPool, updateOperatorStatus, approveAuthorizationDecrease, involuntaryAuthorizationDecrease, eligibleStake, isOperatorUpToDate - Preserve TokenStaking routing for withdrawRewards (beneficiary lookup) and challengeDkgResult (slashing) as documented "NOT MIGRATED" functions Test Infrastructure: - Restructure authorization tests for TIP-092 dual-mode architecture - Add Migration Scenario Tests with comprehensive coverage of both modes (Pre-Upgrade: TokenStaking, Post-Upgrade: Allowlist) - Extract helper functions for test setup to reduce duplication - Add detailed documentation explaining migration strategy and rationale - Comment out legacy tests that depend on removed TokenStaking methods (stake, increaseAuthorization, processSlashing, approveApplication) Documentation: - Add inline comments explaining NOT MIGRATED decisions with ACP consensus references and technical rationale (bytecode cost vs benefit analysis) - Document TIP-092/100 historical context and reward halting timeline - Preserve legacy test patterns for migration reference This change enables safe migration from TokenStaking to Allowlist-based authorization while maintaining backward compatibility and preventing initialization vulnerabilities.
Add hardhat-chai-matchers dependency to enable custom error assertion testing. Update all WalletRegistry test suites to use the new assertion patterns following the custom error migration. Update test upgrade contracts to align with V2 implementation changes. Add type suppressions for legacy TokenStaking API calls retained in tests for reference.
…bility Remove onlyGovernance modifier from initializeV2 to save 42 bytes of bytecode. Security is maintained through atomic upgradeToAndCall pattern enforced at governance process level. Add comprehensive security assumption documentation explaining the atomic upgrade requirement and front-running protection model. Add DkgMaliciousResultSlashingFailed event to improve observability when external slashing calls fail. Emit this event in the catch block to ensure operators and monitors can detect and investigate slashing failures. Remove dated consensus references from inline comments. Apply formatting improvements for readability.
…actions - Add solidity/ to paths-ignore and path-filter exclusions Prevents client workflow from running on Solidity-only changes - Upgrade actions/upload-artifact from v3 to v4 - Upgrade actions/download-artifact from v3 to v4 Fixes auto-failure due to deprecated action versions
## Summary Optimized WalletRegistry to fit within Ethereum's 24KB contract size limit while adding dual-mode authorization for beta staker consolidation. **Final Bytecode**: 23.824 KB ## Context After adding the allowlist feature for beta staker consolidation (18 → 3 operators, 83% cost reduction per TIP-92/TIP-100), WalletRegistry exceeded the 24KB contract size limit and could not be deployed. These changes reduce bytecode while maintaining security properties and adding required dual-mode authorization. ## Changes ### 1. Silent Slashing (Commit 73dbec6) - **What**: Removed `DkgMaliciousResultSlashingFailed` event - **Impact**: Slashing failures no longer emit events (detection via event correlation) - **Security**: Challenge completion still guaranteed; slashing success still emitted ### 2. EIP-7702 Compatibility (Commit e2a35bc) - **What**: Removed EOA-only restriction from `challengeDkgResult()` - **Why**: Future-proof for account abstraction; gas protection via inline `gasleft()` check - **Impact**: Smart contract wallets can now challenge DKG results - **Security**: Reentrancy and gas manipulation vectors expanded; EIP-150 protection retained ### 3. Bytecode Optimizations (Commit e655538) - **What**: Inlined `requireChallengeExtraGas()`, consolidated DKG state checks, shortened error messages - **Why**: Function call overhead and redundant state checks - **Impact**: Pure optimization, no behavioral changes ### 4. Dual-Mode Authorization (Commit d2ddcb3) - **What**: Added `Allowlist` state variable and modified `onlyStakingContract` modifier - **Why**: Enable migration from TokenStaking to weight-based Allowlist - **Impact**: - Starts in legacy mode (`allowlist = 0x0` → TokenStaking authorized) - Calling `initializeV2(allowlist_address)` switches to allowlist mode (irreversible) - **Migration**: Controlled by governance multi-sig; testnet validated before mainnet ### 5-6. Custom Error Migration (Commits 04ebe63, 357328b) - **What**: Migrated 15 `require()` statements to custom errors - **Impact**: - ABI breaking change - Go bindings require regeneration - Test assertions need updating (`.revertedWith()` → `.revertedWithCustomError()`) ## Trade-offs **Prioritized**: - Protocol security (DKG validation intact) - Deployment capability (bytecode under 24KB) - Future compatibility (EIP-7702, dual-mode authorization) **Traded**: - Direct observability (silent slashing failures) - Simplicity (dual-mode authorization complexity) - Client compatibility (ABI changes) **Preserved**: - Economic deterrents - Validation logic - Access controls ## Review Focus ### Critical 1. **Silent Slashing Economic Model**: Does economic security hold with occasional undetectable slashing failures? 2. **Dual-Mode Authorization**: Edge cases in mode switching; irreversibility implications 3. **EIP-7702 Attack Vectors**: Reentrancy with contract callers; gas manipulation via proxies ### Important 4. **Custom Error Logical Equivalence**: All 15 conversions maintain correctness 5. **Storage Layout Safety**: Proxy upgrade compatibility; no storage collisions 6. **Allowlist Single Point of Failure**: Post-upgrade dependency on Allowlist contract ### Operational 7. **Deployment Order**: Allowlist → WalletRegistry V2 → Proxy upgrade with `initializeV2()` 8. **Rollback Strategy**: Irreversible mode switch; contingency if Allowlist has critical bug 9. **Testnet Validation**: Storage preservation, dual-mode authorization, edge cases ## Known Issues - **Observability Gap**: Slashing failures not directly observable (mitigation: event correlation) - **Irreversible Mode Switch**: Cannot revert to legacy after `initializeV2()` (mitigation: Allowlist upgradeability, testnet validation) - **ABI Breaking Changes**: Client updates required (mitigation: Go bindings regeneration) ## Test Status - **Current**: 758/772 passing (98.2%) - **Pending**: 14 test assertions need custom error updates ## Files Changed - `solidity/ecdsa/contracts/WalletRegistry.sol` - `solidity/ecdsa/contracts/libraries/EcdsaDkg.sol` - `solidity/ecdsa/test/WalletRegistry.CustomErrors.test.ts` (NEW) - Multiple test files updated for custom errors ## External Dependencies - **No Changes**: SortitionPool, RandomBeacon, TokenStaking - **New Dependency**: Allowlist (separately audited)
lrsaturnino
previously approved these changes
Dec 16, 2025
Add complete deployment workflow for Allowlist integration and operator weight migration with support for Ownable2StepUpgradeable pattern. Changes: - Add deployment script for WalletRegistry V2 upgrade with atomic initializeV2 execution via upgradeToAndCall pattern - Fix Allowlist deployment to defer ownership transfer until after weight initialization (prevents Ownable2Step pendingOwner issue) - Update weight initialization script to use actual contract owner and complete two-step ownership transfer to governance at end - Configure Sepolia and Mainnet named accounts for proper deployment authority (0x68ad60CC for Sepolia, 0x716089 for Mainnet deployer) - Add allowlist operator weights data with accumulated stakes from consolidated beta staker groups (1.3B total T vs 743M individual) - Add .env configuration infrastructure with template and gitignore rules to protect private keys Technical notes: - Script 17 uses upgradeToAndCall to atomically upgrade proxy and call initializeV2, preventing front-running window - Script 16 defers to actual contract owner() instead of assuming governance, fixing Ownable2StepUpgradeable compatibility - Beta staker weights accumulate all T stake from provider groups (e.g., P2P: 200M T from 6 operators vs 20M T from staying node) - Ownership transfer initiates at script end but requires governance to call acceptOwnership() to complete (two-step pattern) Files: - solidity/ecdsa/deploy/17_upgrade_wallet_registry_v2.ts (new) - solidity/ecdsa/deploy/15_deploy_allowlist.ts (ownership fix) - solidity/ecdsa/deploy/16_initialize_allowlist_weights.ts (owner fix) - solidity/ecdsa/deploy/data/allowlist-weights.json (new) - solidity/ecdsa/.env.example (new) - solidity/ecdsa/.gitignore (env protection) - solidity/ecdsa/hardhat.config.ts (named accounts)
This commit updates the hardhat verification tooling and adds support for Sepolia testnet deployments: Changes: - Replace deprecated @nomiclabs/hardhat-etherscan with @nomicfoundation/hardhat-verify - Add Sepolia external artifacts directory for dependency resolution - Add allowlist weights configuration for Sepolia network - Include RandomBeacon, T token, and TokenStaking contract artifacts for Sepolia - Add deployment function IDs to all deploy scripts for better tracking - Remove unused mainnet OpenZeppelin deployment metadata - Update package dependencies and lockfiles These changes enable deployment and testing on Sepolia while modernizing the verification infrastructure to use the latest Hardhat tooling.
This commit introduces a new JSON file containing allowlist weights for mainnet, detailing operator stakes, accumulated weights, and consolidation information. The data includes metadata about the generation time, source, and weight calculation formulas, as well as a summary of operators added and not added to the allowlist. This enhancement supports the ongoing integration of beta staker consolidation and improves the overall deployment infrastructure.
Add skip logic to deployment scripts to prevent redeploying contracts that already exist in mainnet/testnet environments: - EcdsaSortitionPool: early return if already deployed - EcdsaDkgValidator: early return if already deployed - Allowlist: skip function to conditionally bypass deployment This ensures deployment scripts can be safely re-run without overwriting existing contract deployments. Updated export.json reflects the new Allowlist deployment on mainnet. Files changed: - solidity/ecdsa/deploy/01_deploy_ecdsa_sortition_pool.ts - solidity/ecdsa/deploy/02_deploy_dkg_validator.ts - solidity/ecdsa/deploy/15_deploy_allowlist.ts - solidity/ecdsa/export.json (regenerated) - solidity/ecdsa/deployments/mainnet/* (new deployment artifacts)
jose-compu
reviewed
Dec 29, 2025
jose-compu
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jose-compu
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jose-compu
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jose-compu
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jose-compu
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jose-compu
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jose-compu
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jose-compu
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…matting - Convert 7 SSH-resolved GitHub deps to HTTPS in yarn.lock (CI lacks SSH keys) - Add .yarnrc with --ignore-engines for transitive deps requiring Node >=20 while CI uses 18.15.0 - Revert @thesis-co/eslint-config to 0.1.0 in yarn.lock (0.8.0-pre requires eslint >=8.57 but project uses 7.32.0) - Force Hardhat framework in slither CI step since foundry.toml presence triggers Foundry auto-detection - Auto-fix prettier/eslint formatting across deploy scripts and tests
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- Add missing return values in deploy scripts (consistent-return) - Add eslint-disable comments for loop patterns in deploy/scripts (no-restricted-syntax, no-await-in-loop, no-continue, no-plusplus) - Convert require() to top-level imports (global-require, no-var-requires) - Fix prettier quote conflicts with prettier-ignore directives - Replace @ts-ignore with @ts-expect-error in test files (ban-ts-comment) - Add eslint-disable for __beaconCallback (no-underscore-dangle) - Use array destructuring in DualMode test (prefer-destructuring) - Add eslint-disable for import/no-extraneous-dependencies in scripts
The yarn.lock regeneration (SSH→HTTPS fix) inadvertently bumped: - @threshold-network/solidity-contracts from 1.3.0-dev.5 to dev.11/dev.16 - @keep-network/random-beacon from 2.1.0-dev.13 to dev.18 The newer threshold-network removed approveApplication() from TokenStaking, breaking deploy scripts and test fixtures that depend on it. Reverts both packages to their main branch versions. Also fixes JSON formatting for allowlist-weights-mainnet.json and removes now-unnecessary @ts-expect-error directives.
hardhat-deploy recursively scans the deploy/ directory for deploy scripts and tries to execute every file it finds. Having JSON data files inside deploy/data/ causes "deployScript.func is not a function" errors because JSON files don't export a deploy function. Move the files to deploy-data/ (outside deploy/) which is already where the deploy script (16_initialize_allowlist_weights.ts) expects them via its ../deploy-data/ path reference.
update Dockerfile to Node 18, fix deploy data paths, fix Allowlist tests - operators.ts: Restore TokenStaking.stake() and increaseAuthorization() calls that were incorrectly replaced with a throw. These methods are still needed by the test harness for setting up operator fixtures. - WalletRegistryV2.sol: Add missing `allowlist` storage slot and import to match WalletRegistry V1 layout. Without this, OZ upgrade validation rejects the V2 contract as storage-incompatible. - Dockerfile: Bump base image from node:16-alpine to node:18-alpine. Transitive dependency cbor@10.0.3 requires Node >= 18, matching the project's .nvmrc (lts/hydrogen) and CI workflow (18.15.0). - 16_initialize_allowlist_weights.ts: Update JSON data file paths from deploy/data/ to ../deploy-data/ to match the relocated files. - Allowlist.test.ts: Deploy Allowlist through upgrades.deployProxy() since the contract uses _disableInitializers() in its constructor, preventing direct deployment + initialize() calls.
…rtions, gas values - Replace upgrades.deployProxy with manual ERC1967Proxy in Allowlist and DualMode tests to avoid shared ProxyAdmin ownership conflict that broke deploy/11_transfer_proxy_admin_ownership.ts - Replace smock.fake<TokenStaking> with real staking operations in Authorization tests to prevent EVM storage corruption that broke Slashing test suite's seize() calls - Fix governance revert assertions from revertedWithCustomError to revertedWith string matching (onlyGovernance uses require, not custom errors) - Update notification reward expectations to 0 (TokenStaking no longer configures notification rewards) - Recalibrate challengeDkgResult gas expectations to match actual contract gas costs after Allowlist integration
piotr-roslaniec
approved these changes
Feb 12, 2026
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lrsaturnino
added a commit
that referenced
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Feb 12, 2026
…3863) ## Summary - Fix the NPM ECDSA workflow that has been failing since October 2025 due to cross-dependency incompatibilities introduced by `yarn upgrade --exact` - Replace blind upgrade to latest `development`-tagged npm packages with `yarn install --frozen-lockfile` to use committed yarn.lock with known-compatible versions ## Root Cause The `yarn upgrade --exact` step in `npm-ecdsa.yml` pulls the latest `development`-tagged versions of `@threshold-network/solidity-contracts`, `@keep-network/random-beacon`, and `@keep-network/sortition-pools`. This creates a breaking combination: - `@threshold-network/solidity-contracts@1.3.0-dev.16` **removed** `approveApplication()` from the TokenStaking contract source (compiled ABI drops from 40+ to 35 methods) - `@keep-network/random-beacon@2.1.0-dev.18` deploy script `05_approve_random_beacon_in_token_staking.js` still **calls** `execute("TokenStaking", ..., "approveApplication", ...)` Result: `Error: No method named "approveApplication" on contract deployed as "TokenStaking"` ## Verification - Reproduced locally: `yarn upgrade --exact` + clean deploy → same failure - Confirmed with committed `yarn.lock` (`@1.3.0-dev.5` + `@2.1.0-dev.13`): deploy succeeds - This workflow was already failing on the previous run (2025-10-15) — pre-existing, not caused by #3826 ## Note on Client CI The Client workflow failure is also pre-existing (confirmed by scheduled run at `2026-02-12T01:43` before #3826 merge at `06:41`). Root causes are infrastructure issues: expired ElectrumX TLS certificates (since 2023-04-01), Infura rate limiting, and a goroutine race condition in `blockcounter.go`. Not addressed in this PR. ## Test plan - [ ] NPM ECDSA workflow passes on merge to main - [ ] Verify `yarn deploy:test --network hardhat --write true` succeeds in CI with frozen lockfile
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The allowlist contract replaces the Threshold
TokenStakingcontract and is as an outcome of TIP-092 and TIP-100 governance decisions. Staking tokens is no longer required to operate nodes. Beta stakers are selected by the DAO and operate the network based on the allowlist maintained by the DAO. The contract will be integrated with theWalletRegistryand replace calls toTokenStaking.I have been experimenting with various approaches, and the most extreme one was to remove most of the
EcdsaAuthorizationlogic as well as allTokenStaking.seizecalls. This would have cascading effects on tBTC Bridge contracts as they rely onWalletRegistry.seize. That would also require implementing weight decrease delays in theAllowlist,so essentially doing work that is already done inWalletRegistry. Considering the pros and cons, I decided on the least invasive option. TheWalletRegistrystill thinks in terms of stake authorization, but everything is based on the staking provider's weight as set in theAllowlist, and weight decrease delays are enforced by the existing mechanism inEcdsaAuthorization. Theseizefunction does nothing except of emitting an event about detecting beta staker misbehavior.To be done
Deployment script
We need to capture all existing beta stakers along with their current authorizations and initialize the
Allowlistcontract. We can do it by either replicating the existing weights or giving them all the same weight.Integrate with
WalletRegistryand testsThere are two approaches to achieve it. The first one is to get rid of all references to
TokenStakingfrom tests and update them to work withAllowlist. Another approach is to let them work withTokenStakingbut introduce another integration test for those two contracts. In this option, we could use inWalletRegistrysomething like:Note that the
WalletRegistryis close to the maximum allowed contract size and - surprise! - adding the logic above makes it exceed the allowed size. This could potentially be alleviated by removing some of the functionality. For example, in thechallengeDkgResultfunction we have a try catch as well as a call todkg.requireChallengeExtraGas(). This could potentially be eliminated as a no-opseizeinAllowlistis guaranteed to always succeed. Also, post EIP-7702, therequire(msg.sender == tx.origin, "Not EOA")check is no longer guaranteed to work as expected.