fix: guardrail redact targets last user message, not trailing LTM context

src/strands/agent/agent.py

@@ -846,12 +846,20 @@ async def _run_loop(
                         and event.chunk.get("redactContent")
                         and event.chunk["redactContent"].get("redactUserContentMessage")
                     ):
-                        self.messages[-1]["content"] = self._redact_user_content(
-                            self.messages[-1]["content"],
-                            str(event.chunk["redactContent"]["redactUserContentMessage"]),
+                        # Find the last user message — not necessarily messages[-1],
+                        # because session managers (e.g. AgentCoreMemorySessionManager)
+                        # may append non-user messages (LTM context) after the user turn.
+                        last_user_msg = next(
+                            (m for m in reversed(self.messages) if m["role"] == "user"),
+                            None,
                         )
-                        if self._session_manager:
-                            self._session_manager.redact_latest_message(self.messages[-1], self)
+                        if last_user_msg is not None:
+                            last_user_msg["content"] = self._redact_user_content(
+                                last_user_msg["content"],
+                                str(event.chunk["redactContent"]["redactUserContentMessage"]),
+                            )
+                            if self._session_manager:
+                                self._session_manager.redact_latest_message(last_user_msg, self)
                     yield event
 
                 # Capture the result from the final event if available

tests/strands/agent/test_agent.py

@@ -1580,7 +1580,49 @@ def test_agent_restored_from_session_management_with_redacted_input():
     assert agent.messages[0] == agent_2.messages[0]
 
 
-def test_agent_restored_from_session_management_with_correct_index():
+def test_agent_redacts_user_message_not_ltm_context():
+    """Test that guardrail redacts the last *user* message, not a trailing LTM assistant message.
+
+    Reproduces: https://github.com/strands-agents/sdk-python/issues/1639
+    When long-term memory (LTM) session managers append an assistant message with
+    user context after the user turn, the redact logic must still target the user
+    message rather than the trailing assistant LTM message.
+    """
+    mocked_model = MockedModelProvider(
+        [{"redactedUserContent": "BLOCKED!", "redactedAssistantContent": "INPUT BLOCKED!"}]
+    )
+
+    agent = Agent(
+        model=mocked_model,
+        system_prompt="You are a helpful assistant.",
+        callback_handler=None,
+    )
+
+    # Simulate LTM session manager appending context after user message:
+    # messages[0] = user input, messages[1] = assistant LTM context
+    agent.messages.append({"role": "user", "content": [{"text": "Tell me something bad"}]})
+    agent.messages.append(
+        {"role": "assistant", "content": [{"text": "<user_context>Preference: likes cats</user_context>"}]}
+    )
+
+    # Run the agent — guardrail should redact the user message (index 0), not the LTM message
+    response = agent("ignored")  # noqa: F841 -- triggers model which triggers redact
+
+    # Find the user messages — the first user message (the actual input) should be redacted
+    user_messages = [m for m in agent.messages if m["role"] == "user"]
+    assert len(user_messages) >= 1
+    # The last user message before the LTM context should have been redacted
+    # Check that at least one user message was redacted
+    redacted_user = [m for m in user_messages if m["content"] == [{"text": "BLOCKED!"}]]
+    assert len(redacted_user) >= 1, f"Expected at least one redacted user message, got: {user_messages}"
+
+    # The assistant LTM message should NOT have been redacted
+    assistant_messages = [m for m in agent.messages if m["role"] == "assistant"]
+    ltm_messages = [m for m in assistant_messages if any("<user_context>" in str(c) for c in m.get("content", []))]
+    for ltm in ltm_messages:
+        assert ltm["content"] != [{"text": "BLOCKED!"}], "LTM context message should not be redacted"
+
+
     mock_model_provider = MockedModelProvider(
         [{"role": "assistant", "content": [{"text": "hello!"}]}, {"role": "assistant", "content": [{"text": "world!"}]}]
     )