v0.7.64: snowflake, dynatrace, mintlify, files and security hardening, perf improvements

.agents/skills/add-integration/SKILL.md

@@ -131,20 +131,24 @@ service's official documentation or an unambiguous local execution path proves t
 field is consumed by an AI model. If that cannot be established, preserve existing tool behavior
 and leave the field unannotated.
 
-- **Ordinary provider/API input:** leave it unchanged. Do not add blanket result sanitization.
+- **Ordinary provider/API input:** leave it unchanged. Explicit `{{...}}` references resolve and are
+  sent with their normal request semantics. A URL, domain, resource ID, control field, or opaque
+  payload is not model-visible merely because the provider is AI-backed or may process the
+  referenced resource later.
 - **Text or structured content consumed by an AI model:** declare `request.modelInput` with
   `mode: 'project'` and select only the exact model-visible fields. The shared executor replaces
   activated Sim secrets with canonical `{{NAME}}` labels before request formatting. For nested or
   JSON-string fields, use a small shared selector plus `applyProjected`; verify that selecting the
   rebuilt params reproduces the projected selection.
-- **Opaque model input sent directly to an external provider** such as a model-read URL or image
-  payload: declare `request.opaqueModelInput` with `mode: 'reject-resolved-secrets'` and select only
-  the exact effective value. The shared `executeTool` preflight rejects incomplete or secret-bearing
-  committed provenance before URL/body formatting or network I/O, preserves safe request bytes,
-  and sends no provenance metadata to the provider.
-- **Opaque model input owned by an authenticated internal route** such as uploaded audio, image,
-  video, file bytes, or signed URLs: add `privateProvenance` to a projected request, or use
-  `mode: 'private-provenance'` when there is no textual projection. The route must call
+- **Serialized model content sent directly to an external provider:** include the serialized
+  top-level param in `request.modelInput`. Project the private copy before the existing request
+  formatter parses it; keep formatter behavior deterministic when a whole-value placeholder is not
+  valid in the serialized grammar. Do not introduce a second hard-rejection path.
+- **Opaque model input owned by an authenticated internal route** such as inline audio, image,
+  video, or document bytes: add `privateProvenance` to a projected request, or use
+  `mode: 'private-provenance'` when there is no textual projection. Do not select storage keys,
+  paths, signed URLs, or ordinary remote URLs as byte provenance; the owning route must authorize
+  stored bytes independently at model egress. The route must call
   `validateOpaqueModelInputProvenance` before downloading or sending content to the model and must
   apply the workspace-file provenance guard before reading a persisted workspace file.
 - **Sim-owned durable storage or internal execution handoff** that can later enter a workflow/model
@@ -160,9 +164,9 @@ Hard rules:
 - Never substitute secret plaintext into source or serialize plaintext provenance.
 - Never hand-roll private provenance headers/envelopes; the shared `executeTool` boundary owns
   transport and strips private metadata from functional results.
-- Never attach private provenance to an external URL or to `directExecution`. Use the centralized
-  `opaqueModelInput` rejection mode for external/direct opaque model inputs, or an authenticated
-  internal route when encrypted provenance must cross the boundary.
+- Never attach private provenance to an external URL or to `directExecution`. Project proven
+  model-visible external fields with `request.modelInput`; otherwise preserve ordinary request
+  semantics. Use an authenticated internal route when encrypted provenance must cross the boundary.
 - Never sanitize arbitrary third-party tool results. Projection applies only to secrets activated
   by Sim's resolved-secret provenance for that execution/tool call.
 - Do not add provenance merely because a value is persisted, returned by a tool, or appears in a
@@ -173,12 +177,11 @@ Hard rules:
   provider responses, filenames, URLs, and errors remain unchanged when Sim did not resolve a
   secret into them.
 
-Add focused tests covering named projection, ordinary identical text without provenance, nested
-shape preservation, malformed/incomplete private metadata failing closed, centralized external
-opaque rejection before formatting/I/O without byte changes or metadata transport, headerless
-legacy requests, and absence of private metadata in the public tool result. For durable sinks, also
-cover legacy `NULL` markers, exact-empty new writes, tracked secret writes, stale/missing sidecars,
-and scope isolation.
+Add focused tests covering named projection, ordinary identical text without provenance, nested and
+serialized shape handling, unchanged ordinary external inputs, malformed/incomplete private metadata
+failing closed, headerless legacy requests, and absence of private metadata in the public tool result.
+For durable sinks, also cover legacy `NULL` markers, exact-empty new writes, tracked secret writes,
+stale/missing sidecars, and scope isolation.
 
 ## Step 3: Create Block
 
@@ -594,8 +597,8 @@ If creating V2 versions (API-aligned outputs):
 - [ ] Registered all tools in `tools/registry.ts`
 - [ ] Ran `bun run tool-metadata:generate` and committed the regenerated artifacts
 - [ ] Classified every model-visible, opaque, Sim-durable, and internal-execution request field
-- [ ] Added shared model-input projection, centralized opaque rejection, or private provenance only
-      where required
+- [ ] Added shared model-input projection or private provenance only where required; ordinary
+      external resource locators and control inputs retain their request semantics
 - [ ] Confirmed ordinary third-party tool results are not generically sanitized
 - [ ] Added provenance compatibility and fail-closed boundary tests where applicable
 

.agents/skills/add-tools/SKILL.md

@@ -150,12 +150,16 @@ export const {serviceName}{Action}Tool: ToolConfig<
 - Leave ordinary external API inputs and third-party results unchanged. Add provenance handling only
   when an exact field is proven to cross a Sim model, durable-storage, or internal-execution boundary.
 - Project AI-consumed text/structured fields with the smallest exact `request.modelInput` selector.
-- Reject resolved secrets in opaque model input sent directly to an external provider with
-  `request.opaqueModelInput`; never attach private metadata to an external URL or `directExecution`.
-- For authenticated internal routes, use `privateProvenance` for opaque model input or
-  `request.secretProvenance` for durable writes and execution handoffs. Authenticate first, validate
-  the exact selection and scope, strip the private envelope, then import or propagate provenance at
-  the receiving boundary. Preserve documented headerless legacy behavior.
+- Treat URLs, domains, resource IDs, and control fields as ordinary request values unless the exact
+  field is proven model-visible. For serialized external model content, project the serialized
+  top-level param through `request.modelInput` before the existing formatter parses it; do not add a
+  separate hard-rejection mechanism.
+- For authenticated internal routes, use `privateProvenance` for actual inline/raw model bytes or
+  `request.secretProvenance` for durable writes and execution handoffs. Do not treat a storage key,
+  path, signed URL, or remote URL as provenance for fetched bytes; authorize tracked stored bytes at
+  the owning model-egress boundary. Authenticate first, validate the exact selection and scope,
+  strip the private envelope, then import or propagate provenance at the receiving boundary.
+  Preserve documented headerless legacy behavior.
 - Never substitute secret plaintext into source, serialize plaintext provenance, hand-roll private
   headers, or blanket-sanitize tool results.
 - Add focused tests for named projection, identical unproven public text, malformed/incomplete

.agents/skills/validate-integration/SKILL.md

@@ -141,21 +141,25 @@ search, extraction, or "AI-powered" marketing terminology.
 
 - [ ] AI-consumed text/structured fields use `request.modelInput` with `mode: 'project'` and a
       minimal exact selector; nested/JSON-string adapters preserve shape through `applyProjected`
-- [ ] Opaque AI-consumed values sent directly to an external provider or `directExecution` use
-      `request.opaqueModelInput` with `mode: 'reject-resolved-secrets'` and an exact effective-value
-      selector; the central executor rejects incomplete/secret-bearing committed provenance before
-      formatting or I/O, leaves safe bytes unchanged, and sends no provenance metadata externally
-- [ ] Opaque AI-consumed files/bytes/URLs owned by an authenticated internal route use
+- [ ] Ordinary external URLs, domains, resource IDs, and control fields retain normal request
+      semantics unless the exact field is proven model-visible; an AI-backed provider or later model
+      processing of the referenced resource is not sufficient evidence
+- [ ] Serialized content proven to be sent directly to an external model is selected by
+      `request.modelInput`, projected before the existing formatter parses it, and has deterministic
+      formatter behavior when a whole-value placeholder is invalid for the serialized grammar
+- [ ] Actual inline/raw AI-consumed bytes owned by an authenticated internal route use
       `privateProvenance` (or `mode: 'private-provenance'`), and the route validates
-      `validateOpaqueModelInputProvenance` before any download or model call
+      `validateOpaqueModelInputProvenance` before model egress; storage keys, paths, signed URLs,
+      and ordinary remote URLs are not treated as byte provenance, while tracked stored bytes are
+      authorized independently at the owning model-egress boundary
 - [ ] Persisted workspace-file contents are checked with the shared provenance guard only when
       their bytes or decoded content cross into a model/tool-result boundary; ordinary file APIs
       remain unchanged. Unsupported secret-bearing file paths are rejected at `file_write`
 - [ ] Sim-owned durable writes and internal execution handoffs that can enter workflows/models use
       field-scoped `request.secretProvenance`; authenticated receivers validate the exact selection
       and scope, strip private metadata, and persist, import, or propagate it at the owning boundary
-- [ ] Private provenance is never attached to external URLs or `directExecution`; those paths use
-      centralized `opaqueModelInput` rejection when their opaque values are model-bound
+- [ ] Private provenance is never attached to external URLs or `directExecution`; proven
+      model-visible external fields use projection, while other external inputs remain unchanged
 - [ ] No tool performs raw secret plaintext/source substitution or serializes plaintext provenance
 - [ ] No `transformResponse` or tool-local helper blanket-sanitizes ordinary third-party results;
       only execution-scoped, activated Sim provenance is projected at shared model/log boundaries
@@ -166,10 +170,9 @@ search, extraction, or "AI-powered" marketing terminology.
       metadata, provider results, or API payloads
 - [ ] Diagnostic projection is applied only to values carrying execution-scoped provenance;
       ordinary provider responses, filenames, URLs, and errors are unchanged
-- [ ] Tests cover named `{{NAME}}` projection, unproven identical public text, nested shape
-      preservation, malformed/incomplete metadata, centralized opaque rejection before formatting
-      or I/O with safe-byte preservation, headerless legacy requests, metadata stripping, and
-      durable legacy/stale/scope cases when applicable
+- [ ] Tests cover named `{{NAME}}` projection, unproven identical public text, nested and serialized
+      shape handling, unchanged ordinary external inputs, malformed/incomplete metadata, headerless
+      legacy requests, metadata stripping, and durable legacy/stale/scope cases when applicable
 
 Treat a missing or bypassed model, durable, or internal-execution provenance boundary as
 **critical**. Do not fix it with a tool-specific string replacer or by sanitizing every provider
@@ -348,8 +351,7 @@ Group findings by severity:
 - Service-account metadata disagrees with the canonical OAuth service configuration
 - `tools.config.tool` returning wrong tool ID for an operation
 - Type coercions in `tools.config.tool` instead of `tools.config.params`
-- AI-consumed request fields bypass the shared projection, centralized opaque rejection, or
-  private-provenance boundary
+- Proven model-visible request fields bypass the shared projection or private-provenance boundary
 - Opaque model input is downloaded or sent before provenance and workspace-file checks
 - A Sim-owned durable sink or internal execution handoff drops encrypted provenance or breaks
   legacy headerless/`NULL` data

.claude/commands/add-integration.md

@@ -130,20 +130,24 @@ service's official documentation or an unambiguous local execution path proves t
 field is consumed by an AI model. If that cannot be established, preserve existing tool behavior
 and leave the field unannotated.
 
-- **Ordinary provider/API input:** leave it unchanged. Do not add blanket result sanitization.
+- **Ordinary provider/API input:** leave it unchanged. Explicit `{{...}}` references resolve and are
+  sent with their normal request semantics. A URL, domain, resource ID, control field, or opaque
+  payload is not model-visible merely because the provider is AI-backed or may process the
+  referenced resource later.
 - **Text or structured content consumed by an AI model:** declare `request.modelInput` with
   `mode: 'project'` and select only the exact model-visible fields. The shared executor replaces
   activated Sim secrets with canonical `{{NAME}}` labels before request formatting. For nested or
   JSON-string fields, use a small shared selector plus `applyProjected`; verify that selecting the
   rebuilt params reproduces the projected selection.
-- **Opaque model input sent directly to an external provider** such as a model-read URL or image
-  payload: declare `request.opaqueModelInput` with `mode: 'reject-resolved-secrets'` and select only
-  the exact effective value. The shared `executeTool` preflight rejects incomplete or secret-bearing
-  committed provenance before URL/body formatting or network I/O, preserves safe request bytes,
-  and sends no provenance metadata to the provider.
-- **Opaque model input owned by an authenticated internal route** such as uploaded audio, image,
-  video, file bytes, or signed URLs: add `privateProvenance` to a projected request, or use
-  `mode: 'private-provenance'` when there is no textual projection. The route must call
+- **Serialized model content sent directly to an external provider:** include the serialized
+  top-level param in `request.modelInput`. Project the private copy before the existing request
+  formatter parses it; keep formatter behavior deterministic when a whole-value placeholder is not
+  valid in the serialized grammar. Do not introduce a second hard-rejection path.
+- **Opaque model input owned by an authenticated internal route** such as inline audio, image,
+  video, or document bytes: add `privateProvenance` to a projected request, or use
+  `mode: 'private-provenance'` when there is no textual projection. Do not select storage keys,
+  paths, signed URLs, or ordinary remote URLs as byte provenance; the owning route must authorize
+  stored bytes independently at model egress. The route must call
   `validateOpaqueModelInputProvenance` before downloading or sending content to the model and must
   apply the workspace-file provenance guard before reading a persisted workspace file.
 - **Sim-owned durable storage or internal execution handoff** that can later enter a workflow/model
@@ -159,9 +163,9 @@ Hard rules:
 - Never substitute secret plaintext into source or serialize plaintext provenance.
 - Never hand-roll private provenance headers/envelopes; the shared `executeTool` boundary owns
   transport and strips private metadata from functional results.
-- Never attach private provenance to an external URL or to `directExecution`. Use the centralized
-  `opaqueModelInput` rejection mode for external/direct opaque model inputs, or an authenticated
-  internal route when encrypted provenance must cross the boundary.
+- Never attach private provenance to an external URL or to `directExecution`. Project proven
+  model-visible external fields with `request.modelInput`; otherwise preserve ordinary request
+  semantics. Use an authenticated internal route when encrypted provenance must cross the boundary.
 - Never sanitize arbitrary third-party tool results. Projection applies only to secrets activated
   by Sim's resolved-secret provenance for that execution/tool call.
 - Do not add provenance merely because a value is persisted, returned by a tool, or appears in a
@@ -172,12 +176,11 @@ Hard rules:
   provider responses, filenames, URLs, and errors remain unchanged when Sim did not resolve a
   secret into them.
 
-Add focused tests covering named projection, ordinary identical text without provenance, nested
-shape preservation, malformed/incomplete private metadata failing closed, centralized external
-opaque rejection before formatting/I/O without byte changes or metadata transport, headerless
-legacy requests, and absence of private metadata in the public tool result. For durable sinks, also
-cover legacy `NULL` markers, exact-empty new writes, tracked secret writes, stale/missing sidecars,
-and scope isolation.
+Add focused tests covering named projection, ordinary identical text without provenance, nested and
+serialized shape handling, unchanged ordinary external inputs, malformed/incomplete private metadata
+failing closed, headerless legacy requests, and absence of private metadata in the public tool result.
+For durable sinks, also cover legacy `NULL` markers, exact-empty new writes, tracked secret writes,
+stale/missing sidecars, and scope isolation.
 
 ## Step 3: Create Block
 
@@ -593,8 +596,8 @@ If creating V2 versions (API-aligned outputs):
 - [ ] Registered all tools in `tools/registry.ts`
 - [ ] Ran `bun run tool-metadata:generate` and committed the regenerated artifacts
 - [ ] Classified every model-visible, opaque, Sim-durable, and internal-execution request field
-- [ ] Added shared model-input projection, centralized opaque rejection, or private provenance only
-      where required
+- [ ] Added shared model-input projection or private provenance only where required; ordinary
+      external resource locators and control inputs retain their request semantics
 - [ ] Confirmed ordinary third-party tool results are not generically sanitized
 - [ ] Added provenance compatibility and fail-closed boundary tests where applicable