Prevent secret leakage#1103
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RPCClient, SNodeClient, mgmt_node_ops, and the Grafana/Graylog helpers in cluster_ops now accept SecretStr-typed credentials so payload dicts and model objects can be logged at DEBUG without leaking the value (SecretStr masks in repr/str/dict-repr). Secrets are unwrapped only at the wire-send site via the shared helper ``unwrap_secrets_for_send``. Response bodies are gated behind a new ``SB_LOG_RESPONSE_BODIES`` setting (default off). The previous wholesale ``response.text`` / ``response.content`` logging at DEBUG is the leak vector here: responses are untyped, so there is no equivalent of SecretStr masking once a body is in hand. Drop the body from exception messages too — keep the status code, hide the text.
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| default_cluster = None | ||
| monitoring_secret = os.environ.get("MONITORING_SECRET", "") | ||
| monitoring_secret = SecretStr(os.environ.get("MONITORING_SECRET", "")) |
| db_controller = DBController() | ||
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| def _create_update_user(cluster_id, grafana_url, grafana_secret, user_secret, update_secret=False): | ||
| def _create_update_user(cluster_id, grafana_url, grafana_secret: SecretStr, user_secret: SecretStr, update_secret=False): |
| from pydantic import SecretBytes, SecretStr | ||
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| def unwrap_secrets_for_send(obj: Any) -> Any: |
| return obj | ||
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| def unwrap_secret(value: Union[SecretStr, str, None]) -> Optional[str]: |
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The extensive logging done throughout the application may inadvertently leak confidential data. This PR aims to mitigate this, preventing secrets to be present in the logs.
The core tool in this PR is the use of pydantic's
SecretStr/SecretBytes. They are a simple wrapper aroundstr/bytes, that, when converted to string yield a redacted string (**********). The actual value needs to be explicitly unwrapped viaget_secret_value().This changeset introduces:
What htis PR notably does not do, is prevent explicit leakage through endpoints that currently allow access to the confidential values. Handling that in a better way is left as a follow-up.