Cancel-safe async io_uring read backend for RustFS storage.
When a caller drops the future of an in-flight read (an erasure-code quorum was reached, a timeout, a disconnect), the kernel may still write into the read buffer until the CQE — so freeing it at future-drop is a use-after-free. This crate owns each buffer and file handle in the driver's pending table from submission until the CQE, reclaims only at the CQE, drains in-flight ops to zero on shutdown (with a bounded leak-over-UAF escape hatch for a hung disk), and aborts rather than free in-flight buffers on a driver-thread panic. The per-invariant rationale lives inline in src/driver.rs and on docs.rs.
Status: read path only, Linux only (an empty stub on other targets). Wired into
rustfs/rustfsbehind a runtime probe, off by default (RUSTFS_IO_URING_READ_ENABLE). SeeCHANGELOG.md.
[target.'cfg(target_os = "linux")'.dependencies]
rustfs-uring = "0.2.1"use std::fs::File;
use std::sync::Arc;
use rustfs_uring::UringDriver;
# async fn demo() -> std::io::Result<()> {
// Probe a real IORING_OP_READ before accepting work. On a restricted host the
// ProbeFailure's `is_expected_restriction()` says to degrade to the std backend.
let driver = UringDriver::probe_and_start(64).expect("io_uring available");
let file = Arc::new(File::open("/data/object")?);
// Positioned read (whole-range: short reads are resubmitted). Dropping the
// returned future before it completes is safe — the driver owns the buffer.
let bytes = driver.read_at(Arc::clone(&file), 0, 65536).await?;
let snapshot = driver.shutdown();
assert_eq!(snapshot.delivered + snapshot.orphan_reclaimed, snapshot.submitted);
# Ok(())
# }read_at(file, offset, len)— positioned (pread) read, whole-range.read_at_direct(file, offset, len, align)— the same for anO_DIRECTfd;offset/lenneed not be aligned (the driver reads a block-aligned superset and returns exactly the requested range).read_current(file, len)—read(2)semantics from the current position, for pipes and other non-seekable fds (a short read is a valid final result).probe_and_start_sharded(entries, shards)— several independent rings per disk (each ring caps at one core's memory bandwidth for cache-hit reads);probe_and_start(entries)equals..._sharded(entries, 1).
Linux only; on other hosts cargo check builds the empty stub.
# On a Linux host with io_uring available:
cargo test -- --nocapture --test-threads=1
# Two legs in Docker (also on macOS via Docker Desktop / OrbStack):
# leg 1 — io_uring blocked by an explicit seccomp profile → every test MUST
# degrade to a graceful skip;
# leg 2 — seccomp=unconfined → real io_uring, and NO test may skip.
./run-docker.shThe harness fails on a non-degrading leg 1 or a vacuous-pass leg 2, so a skipped suite can never masquerade as coverage. The cancel-safety contract is pinned by the acceptance tests in tests/cancel.rs; the fault-injection feature (test-only) drives the panic-abort, bounded-drain-leak, and probe-failure escape hatches in tests/fault_injection.rs.
Apache-2.0. See LICENSE.