docs: Operator Go Versioning Policy#3010
Conversation
Signed-off-by: Fortune-Ndlovu <fndlovu@redhat.com>
Code Review by Qodo
Context used✅ Compliance rules (platform):
18 rules 1. Broken Renovate config link
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PR Summary by QodoDocument Go versioning policy for rhdh-operator install methods WalkthroughsDescription• Add a written Go versioning policy for rhdh-operator maintainers and reviewers. • Clarify update rules for go.mod, toolchain, go-toolset images, and Renovate constraints. • Provide concrete verification commands for confirming Go versions in images and binaries. Diagramgraph TD
A([Maintainers/Reviewers]) --> B["Go version policy doc"] --> C["go.mod (go/toolchain)"] --> G["Operator binary/image"]
B --> D[".github/renovate.json (constraints.go)"] --> C
B --> E["Dockerfile (builder FROM)"] --> F[("UBI go-toolset image")] --> G
subgraph Legend
direction LR
_h([Human]) ~~~ _f["Config/doc file"] ~~~ _img[("Build image")]
end
High-Level AssessmentThe following are alternative approaches to this PR: 1. Add CI guardrails to enforce policy invariants
2. Capture as an ADR / release-process doc alongside existing workflows
Recommendation: The PR’s approach (a dedicated, explicit policy document) is the right first step because the behavior depends on multiple independently-versioned controls (go.mod directives, go-toolset image, Renovate constraints). As follow-ups, consider adding a lightweight CI check to ensure File ChangesDocumentation (1)
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/cc @rm3l |
rm3l
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Looks great overall and aligns with what was requested in https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/RHIDP-14096. A few comments.
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Code review by qodo was updated up to the latest commit e483b82 |
Signed-off-by: Fortune Ndlovu <fndlovu@redhat.com>
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hey @rm3l The PR checks are failing because actions/checkout was upgraded to v7 in #3031, which now blocks checking out fork PR code in Error: Refusing to check out fork pull request code from a 'pull_request_target' workflow. This workflow runs with the base repository's GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets, default-branch cache scope, and runner access. Fetching and executing a fork's code in that trusted context commonly leads to "pwn request" vulnerabilities. To opt in, review the risks at https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target and set 'allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true' on the actions/checkout step.This only affects fork-based PRs, same-repo PRs (like Renovate's) pass fine. The existing authorize job already gates untrusted forks behind manual approval, so adding |
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Code review by qodo was updated up to the latest commit c0afb3b |



Description
Standardizing on our Install Methods Go Version Policy. All input is welcome.
Which issue(s) does this PR fix or relate to
Resolves: https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/RHIDP-14096
PR acceptance criteria
How to test changes / Special notes to the reviewer