feat(rules): New UAC bypass via NTFS junction DLL hijacking rule#625
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Detects potential User Account Control (UAC) bypass activity leveraging NTFS junctions in combination with DLL hijacking to achieve elevated code execution. Attackers can manipulate filesystem redirection features to coerce trusted Windows components into loading malicious libraries.
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What is the purpose of this PR / why it is needed?
Detects potential User Account Control (UAC) bypass activity leveraging NTFS junctions in combination with DLL hijacking to achieve elevated code execution. Attackers can manipulate filesystem redirection features to coerce trusted Windows components into loading malicious libraries.
What type of change does this PR introduce?
/kind feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
Any specific area of the project related to this PR?
/area rules
Special notes for the reviewer
Does this PR introduce a user-facing change?