Sanitize connection observability terminal escape sequences#1306
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mscoutermarsh wants to merge 1 commit into
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Sanitize connection observability terminal escape sequences#1306mscoutermarsh wants to merge 1 commit into
mscoutermarsh wants to merge 1 commit into
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Strip C0/C1 control characters from attacker-controllable connection fields (query text, application_name, username, client_addr, and related display cells) in both human `show` output and the connections TUI so CSI/OSC sequences cannot spoof the operator terminal or hijack the clipboard. Co-authored-by: Mike Coutermarsh <mike@planetscale.com>
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Summary
Connection observability (
pscale branch connections showand thetopTUI) was writing attacker-controllable fields from live connection snapshots (QueryText,Username,ApplicationName,ClientAddr, and related display cells) to the operator terminal without stripping control/escape bytes. Anyone with connect access to the observed branch could inject CSI/OSC sequences to spoof rows, inject hyperlinks, or write the clipboard (OSC-52) on permissive terminals.Fix
SanitizeDisplayText/SanitizeMultilineDisplayTextininternal/connectionsthat strips ASCII C0 controls, DEL, and C1 controls.showfield/query sinks and to TUI sinks (queryPreview, selected status,appText,emptyDash, detail field values). ExistingsanitizeFooterTextnow delegates to the shared helper.Tests
go test ./internal/connections/ ./internal/connections/tui/ ./internal/cmd/branch/connections/