fix(authz): widen the driver's native tenant scope to the group membership union — ADR-0105 D2 reaches the wire (#3623)

.changeset/group-union-driver-scope.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+---
+"@objectstack/spec": patch
+"@objectstack/objectql": patch
+"@objectstack/driver-sql": patch
+"@objectstack/plugin-security": patch
+---
+
+fix(authz): widen the driver's native tenant scope to the membership union
+under the `group` posture — ADR-0105 D2 finally reaches the wire (#3623)
+
+The Layer 0 wall correctly compiled `organization_id IN accessible_org_ids`
+under `group`, but the ObjectQL engine also propagated the active-org
+`tenantId` into `DriverOptions` unconditionally, and the SQL driver's native
+scoping ANDed `organization_id = tenantId` under the union — collapsing every
+group read back to active-org (isolated) reach. Found by the cloud-side
+`ee-group-showcase` dogfood (cloud#880), the first end-to-end boot of `group`
+against a real driver.
+
+- `DriverOptions.tenantIds` (spec): the union tenant access set. Drivers with
+  native scoping widen reads/updates/deletes/aggregates to `IN (...)`,
+  keeping the NULL-tenant global-row carve-out; inserts still stamp from
+  `tenantId` (the active organization is the write target, D5). Absent or
+  empty ⇒ equality fallback — fail toward isolation, never toward exposure.
+- ObjectQL engine threads `ExecutionContext.accessible_org_ids` as
+  `tenantIds` when the tenancy posture is `group`, reported by a new
+  `setTenancyPostureProvider` seam.
+- SecurityPlugin wires that provider at start — deliberately from the
+  enforcement layer, so the driver wall only widens while the Layer 0 union
+  wall enforces above it. Embeddings without plugin-security keep active-org
+  equality.

content/docs/references/data/driver.mdx

@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ const result = DriverCapabilities.parse(data);
 | **skipCache** | `boolean` | optional | Bypass cache |
 | **traceContext** | `Record<string, string>` | optional | OpenTelemetry context or request ID |
 | **tenantId** | `string` | optional | Tenant Isolation identifier |
+| **tenantIds** | `string[]` | optional | Union tenant access set (group posture): native read scoping widens to organization_id IN (...); inserts still stamp from tenantId |
 | **timezone** | `string` | optional | Business reference timezone (IANA) for date-dependent generation, e.g. autonumber date tokens |
 | **preserveAudit** | `boolean` | optional | Historical import: keep a supplied updated_at instead of force-stamping now (from ExecutionContext.preserveAudit) |
 

packages/objectql/src/engine.test.ts

@@ -591,6 +591,50 @@ describe('ObjectQL Engine', () => {
         });
     });
 
+    describe('group posture widens driver scope to the membership union (#3623, ADR-0105 D2)', () => {
+        // Regression: the engine stamped only the active-org `tenantId` into
+        // driver options, so the SQL driver's native equality scope ANDed
+        // under the Layer 0 union and collapsed `group` reads back to
+        // active-org reach. Under the group posture (reported by the
+        // SecurityPlugin-wired provider) the engine now ALSO threads the
+        // caller's `accessible_org_ids` as `tenantIds`.
+        beforeEach(async () => {
+            engine.registerDriver(mockDriver, true);
+            await engine.init();
+            vi.mocked(SchemaRegistry.getObject).mockReturnValue({ name: 'task', fields: {} });
+        });
+
+        const lastFindOpts = () => (mockDriver.find as any).mock.calls.at(-1)?.[2];
+        const groupCtx = { tenantId: 'org_a', accessible_org_ids: ['org_a', 'org_b'] } as any;
+
+        it('threads accessible_org_ids as tenantIds under the group posture', async () => {
+            (engine as any).setTenancyPostureProvider(() => 'group');
+            await engine.find('task', { filters: [] }, { context: groupCtx });
+            expect(lastFindOpts()).toMatchObject({ tenantId: 'org_a', tenantIds: ['org_a', 'org_b'] });
+        });
+
+        it('no provider (no enforcement layer) → equality only, never widened', async () => {
+            await engine.find('task', { filters: [] }, { context: groupCtx });
+            expect(lastFindOpts()?.tenantIds).toBeUndefined();
+            expect(lastFindOpts()).toMatchObject({ tenantId: 'org_a' });
+        });
+
+        it('isolated posture → equality only (the union is a group-only widening)', async () => {
+            (engine as any).setTenancyPostureProvider(() => 'isolated');
+            await engine.find('task', { filters: [] }, { context: groupCtx });
+            expect(lastFindOpts()?.tenantIds).toBeUndefined();
+        });
+
+        it('group with an absent/empty accessible set → equality only (fail toward isolation)', async () => {
+            (engine as any).setTenancyPostureProvider(() => 'group');
+            await engine.find('task', { filters: [] }, { context: { tenantId: 'org_a', accessible_org_ids: [] } as any });
+            expect(lastFindOpts()?.tenantIds).toBeUndefined();
+            await engine.find('task', { filters: [] }, { context: { tenantId: 'org_a' } as any });
+            expect(lastFindOpts()?.tenantIds).toBeUndefined();
+        });
+
+    });
+
     describe('tenancy.enabled:false objects are platform-global (#3249, ADR-0066)', () => {
         // Regression: buildDriverOptions stamped execCtx.tenantId into driver
         // options unconditionally, so a platform-global object (sys_license)

packages/objectql/src/engine.ts

@@ -373,6 +373,11 @@ export class ObjectQL implements IDataEngine {
   // persists cleartext). Injected by the host via setCryptoProvider().
   private cryptoProvider?: ICryptoProvider;
 
+  // [ADR-0105 D2 / #3623] Posture accessor for driver-scope widening under the
+  // `group` posture. Injected by SecurityPlugin via setTenancyPostureProvider();
+  // absent = equality scoping (fail toward isolation).
+  private tenancyPostureProvider?: () => string | undefined;
+
   // Per-engine SchemaRegistry instance.
   //
   // Historically SchemaRegistry was a process-wide singleton of static state,
@@ -871,6 +876,20 @@ export class ObjectQL implements IDataEngine {
     if (hasTenant && opts.tenantId === undefined) {
       opts.tenantId = execCtx!.tenantId;
     }
+    // [ADR-0105 D2 / #3623] Under the `group` posture the caller's read reach
+    // is their whole membership set, not the active org — thread it so the
+    // driver's native scope widens to the SAME union Layer 0 enforces, instead
+    // of ANDing an active-org equality under it (which collapsed group reads
+    // to isolated semantics). Inserts still stamp from `tenantId` (the active
+    // org is the write target, D5). No provider / other postures / absent set
+    // → no `tenantIds`, and drivers fall back to equality: fail toward
+    // isolation, never toward exposure.
+    if (hasTenant && opts.tenantIds === undefined && this.tenancyPostureProvider?.() === 'group') {
+      const set = (execCtx as any)?.accessible_org_ids;
+      if (Array.isArray(set) && set.length > 0) {
+        opts.tenantIds = set.map(String);
+      }
+    }
     if (hasTz && opts.timezone === undefined) {
       // Thread the business timezone so date-dependent driver generation
       // (autonumber `{YYYYMMDD}` tokens) resolves the calendar day correctly.
@@ -1473,6 +1492,23 @@ export class ObjectQL implements IDataEngine {
     this.logger.info('CryptoProvider configured for secret fields');
   }
 
+  /**
+   * [ADR-0105 D2 / #3623] Inject the tenancy-posture accessor that decides
+   * whether driver-level native tenant scoping widens to the caller's whole
+   * membership set (`DriverOptions.tenantIds`, the `group` posture's union)
+   * instead of the active-org equality (`DriverOptions.tenantId`).
+   *
+   * Wired by the enforcement layer (SecurityPlugin) — deliberately NOT
+   * self-derived from env here: the posture in force is an entitlement
+   * question (`tenancy` service), and widening the driver wall is only safe
+   * when the Layer 0 union wall is actually enforcing above it. No provider
+   * (an embedding without plugin-security) keeps today's equality scoping —
+   * fail toward isolation, never toward exposure.
+   */
+  setTenancyPostureProvider(provider: () => string | undefined): void {
+    this.tenancyPostureProvider = provider;
+  }
+
   /**
    * Normalize credential fields on `row` in place before it reaches the driver.
    *

packages/plugins/driver-sql/src/sql-driver-tenant-scope.test.ts

@@ -368,4 +368,75 @@ describe('SqlDriver tenant scope (organization_id)', () => {
       expect(warnSpy).toHaveLength(0);
     });
   });
+
+  // [ADR-0105 D2 / #3623] Group posture: the engine threads the caller's whole
+  // membership set as `tenantIds`; the native scope widens to `IN (...)` so it
+  // matches the Layer 0 union instead of collapsing it to active-org equality.
+  describe('union tenant scope — tenantIds (group posture, #3623)', () => {
+    it('find with tenantIds spans exactly the listed tenants', async () => {
+      const rows = await driver.find(
+        'account',
+        { object: 'account' },
+        { tenantId: 'org_a', tenantIds: ['org_a', 'org_b'] } as any,
+      );
+      expect(rows.map(r => r.id).sort()).toEqual(['a1', 'a2', 'b1', 'b2']);
+    });
+
+    it('tenants OUTSIDE the set stay invisible', async () => {
+      await driver.create('account', { id: 'c1', organization_id: 'org_c', name: 'C1' });
+      const rows = await driver.find(
+        'account',
+        { object: 'account' },
+        { tenantId: 'org_a', tenantIds: ['org_a', 'org_b'] } as any,
+      );
+      expect(rows.map(r => r.id)).not.toContain('c1');
+    });
+
+    it('keeps the NULL-tenant global-row carve-out (#2734) on the union path', async () => {
+      await driver.create('account', { id: 'g1', name: 'GLOBAL' });
+      const rows = await driver.find(
+        'account',
+        { object: 'account' },
+        { tenantId: 'org_a', tenantIds: ['org_a'] } as any,
+      );
+      expect(rows.map(r => r.id).sort()).toEqual(['a1', 'a2', 'g1']);
+    });
+
+    it('an empty or malformed tenantIds falls back to tenantId equality (fail toward isolation)', async () => {
+      const empty = await driver.find(
+        'account',
+        { object: 'account' },
+        { tenantId: 'org_a', tenantIds: [] } as any,
+      );
+      expect(empty.map(r => r.id).sort()).toEqual(['a1', 'a2']);
+      const malformed = await driver.find(
+        'account',
+        { object: 'account' },
+        { tenantId: 'org_a', tenantIds: [null, ''] } as any,
+      );
+      expect(malformed.map(r => r.id).sort()).toEqual(['a1', 'a2']);
+    });
+
+    it('update/delete reach widens with the set — but only within it', async () => {
+      const unionOpts = { tenantId: 'org_a', tenantIds: ['org_a', 'org_b'] } as any;
+      await driver.update('account', 'b1', { tier: 'platinum' }, unionOpts);
+      const b1 = await driver.findOne('account', { object: 'account', where: { id: 'b1' } });
+      expect(b1.tier).toBe('platinum');
+      // A tenant OUTSIDE the set stays untouchable — the widened wall still walls.
+      await driver.create('account', { id: 'c1', organization_id: 'org_c', name: 'C1', tier: 'gold' });
+      await driver.update('account', 'c1', { tier: 'compromised' }, unionOpts);
+      const c1 = await driver.findOne('account', { object: 'account', where: { id: 'c1' } });
+      expect(c1.tier).toBe('gold');
+    });
+
+    it('insert injection STILL stamps from tenantId (active org = write target, D5)', async () => {
+      await driver.create(
+        'account',
+        { id: 'n1', name: 'New' },
+        { tenantId: 'org_a', tenantIds: ['org_a', 'org_b'] } as any,
+      );
+      const row = await driver.findOne('account', { object: 'account', where: { id: 'n1' } });
+      expect(row?.organization_id).toBe('org_a');
+    });
+  });
 });

packages/plugins/driver-sql/src/sql-driver.ts

@@ -2830,6 +2830,23 @@ export class SqlDriver implements IDataDriver {
     if (tenantId === undefined || tenantId === null || tenantId === '') return builder;
     const field = this.resolveTenantField(object);
     if (!field) return builder;
+    // [ADR-0105 D2 / #3623] Union tenant scope: under the `group` posture the
+    // engine threads the caller's whole membership set as `tenantIds`, and the
+    // native wall widens to `IN (...)` — the SAME union the Layer 0
+    // authorization wall enforces above. Equality here would AND under that
+    // union and collapse group reads to active-org reach. A malformed or
+    // empty set falls through to the equality path: fail toward isolation,
+    // never toward exposure. Insert-side injection (injectTenantOnInsert)
+    // deliberately keeps `tenantId` — the active org is the write target (D5).
+    const rawIds = (options as any)?.tenantIds;
+    const tenantIds = Array.isArray(rawIds)
+      ? rawIds.filter((v: unknown) => typeof v === 'string' && v !== '')
+      : [];
+    if (tenantIds.length > 0) {
+      return builder.where((b) => {
+        void b.whereIn(field, tenantIds.map(String)).orWhereNull(field);
+      });
+    }
     // `(field = :tenantId OR field IS NULL)` — a NULL tenant column marks a
     // GLOBAL/platform row (bootstrap-seeded positions and permission sets,
     // business units, pre-org first-boot seeds). Such a row belongs to no

packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.test.ts

@@ -92,6 +92,48 @@ describe('SecurityPlugin', () => {
     await expect(plugin.destroy()).resolves.toBeUndefined();
   });
 
+  // [ADR-0105 D2 / #3623] start() hands the engine a posture accessor so the
+  // driver-level native tenant scope can widen to the membership union under
+  // `group`. Wired from the enforcement layer on purpose: no SecurityPlugin,
+  // no widening.
+  it('wires the tenancy-posture provider onto the engine, reporting the LIVE cached posture', async () => {
+    const plugin = new SecurityPlugin();
+    const registerMiddleware = vi.fn();
+    const setTenancyPostureProvider = vi.fn();
+    const manifestService = { register: vi.fn() };
+    const ctx: any = {
+      logger: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn() },
+      registerService: vi.fn(),
+      getService: vi.fn().mockImplementation((name: string) => {
+        if (name === 'manifest') return manifestService;
+        if (name === 'tenancy') return { posture: 'group' };
+        return { registerMiddleware, setTenancyPostureProvider };
+      }),
+    };
+    await plugin.init(ctx);
+    await plugin.start(ctx);
+    expect(setTenancyPostureProvider).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.any(Function));
+    const provider = setTenancyPostureProvider.mock.calls[0][0] as () => string;
+    expect(provider()).toBe('group');
+  });
+
+  it('an engine without the provider seam is tolerated (older engine)', async () => {
+    const plugin = new SecurityPlugin();
+    const registerMiddleware = vi.fn();
+    const manifestService = { register: vi.fn() };
+    const ctx: any = {
+      logger: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn() },
+      registerService: vi.fn(),
+      getService: vi.fn().mockImplementation((name: string) => {
+        if (name === 'manifest') return manifestService;
+        if (name === 'tenancy') return { posture: 'group' };
+        return { registerMiddleware };
+      }),
+    };
+    await plugin.init(ctx);
+    await expect(plugin.start(ctx)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
   // org-scoping probe — when @objectstack/plugin-org-scoping is installed
   // (i.e. the `org-scoping` service is registered), SecurityPlugin keeps

packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts

@@ -510,6 +510,19 @@ export class SecurityPlugin implements Plugin {
         this.tenancyPosture = 'single';
       }
     }
+    // [ADR-0105 D2 / #3623] Hand the engine a posture accessor so its
+    // driver-level NATIVE tenant scoping can widen to the caller's membership
+    // union (`DriverOptions.tenantIds`) under the `group` posture. Wired from
+    // HERE — the enforcement layer — on purpose: widening the driver wall is
+    // only safe while the Layer 0 union wall enforces above it, so an
+    // embedding without SecurityPlugin never widens (drivers keep active-org
+    // equality — fail toward isolation).
+    try {
+      const engineSvc = ctx.getService<{ setTenancyPostureProvider?: (p: () => string | undefined) => void }>('objectql');
+      engineSvc?.setTenancyPostureProvider?.(() => this.tenancyPosture);
+    } catch {
+      /* engine absent — nothing to widen */
+    }
     // [ADR-0105 D11] Optional app/plugin membership resolver for the §7.3.1
     // `IN (current_user.<key>)` sets. Absent is the norm — probe once.
     try {

packages/spec/src/data/driver.zod.ts

@@ -38,6 +38,27 @@ export const DriverOptionsSchema = lazySchema(() => z.object({
    */
   tenantId: z.string().optional().describe('Tenant Isolation identifier'),
 
+  /**
+   * [ADR-0105 D2 / #3623] Tenant access SET for union-scoped postures.
+   *
+   * Under the `group` tenancy posture a caller's read reach is every
+   * organization they hold a membership in (`organization_id IN (...)`), not
+   * just the active one. The engine threads `ExecutionContext.accessible_org_ids`
+   * here so the driver's NATIVE tenant scoping widens to the same union the
+   * Layer 0 authorization wall enforces — otherwise the driver's
+   * `organization_id = tenantId` equality ANDs under the union and collapses
+   * group reads back to active-org reach.
+   *
+   * Semantics for drivers that implement native scoping:
+   * - non-empty array → scope reads/updates/deletes/aggregates with `IN`,
+   *   keeping any NULL-tenant global-row carve-out the equality path has;
+   * - absent or empty → fall back to `tenantId` equality (fail toward
+   *   isolation, never toward exposure);
+   * - insert-side tenant injection ALWAYS uses `tenantId` (the active
+   *   organization is the write target — ADR-0105 D5).
+   */
+  tenantIds: z.array(z.string()).optional().describe('Union tenant access set (group posture): native read scoping widens to organization_id IN (...); inserts still stamp from tenantId'),
+
   /**
    * Business reference timezone (IANA name, e.g. `Asia/Shanghai`) for the
    * request, threaded from `ExecutionContext.timezone` (ADR-0053). Drivers that