feat(plugin-auth): password history / no-reuse (ADR-0069 D1, P1)

.changeset/adr-0069-d1-password-history.md

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/platform-objects': minor
+'@objectstack/service-settings': minor
+'@objectstack/plugin-auth': minor
+---
+
+Auth: password history / no-reuse (ADR-0069 D1, P1)
+
+Adds `password_history_count` (0–24, 0 = off) to the `auth` password-policy settings. On `/change-password` and `/reset-password`, a new password that matches the current password or any of the last N hashes is rejected with `PASSWORD_REUSE`. A new bounded `sys_account.previous_password_hashes` column (JSON ring, system-managed, hidden) backs the check; it is maintained by before/after hooks (capture the old hash, append on success).
+
+Reuses better-auth's native `password.verify` (no bespoke crypto) and resolves the reset-flow user via the same token lookup better-auth uses. Default-off / additive (no upgrade behavior change); per ADR-0049 the setting ships with its enforcement.

packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-account.object.ts

@@ -192,6 +192,17 @@ export const SysAccount = ObjectSchema.create({
       required: false,
       description: 'Hashed password for email/password provider',
     }),
+
+    // ADR-0069 D1 — bounded ring of previous password hashes (JSON array of
+    // strings), used to reject password reuse on change/reset. Maintained by
+    // the auth manager; never exposed in UI.
+    previous_password_hashes: Field.textarea({
+      label: 'Previous Password Hashes',
+      required: false,
+      readonly: true,
+      hidden: true,
+      description: 'JSON array of prior password hashes (bounded by password_history_count); reuse-prevention only. System-managed.',
+    }),
   },
 
   indexes: [

packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.test.ts

@@ -1778,4 +1778,76 @@ describe('AuthManager', () => {
       });
     });
   });
+
+  // ADR-0069 D1: password history (reject reuse). Custom logic, but reuses
+  // better-auth's native hash/verify — tested here with a stub verify + a
+  // where-aware sys_account mock.
+  describe('password history / reuse prevention (ADR-0069 D1)', () => {
+    const SECRET = 'test-secret-at-least-32-chars-long';
+    // verify() returns true when the candidate equals the plaintext that a hash
+    // encodes — we model hashes as `hash:<plaintext>` for the stub.
+    const stubVerify = async ({ password, hash }: { password: string; hash: string }) =>
+      hash === `hash:${password}`;
+    const makeEngine = (account: any) => ({
+      findOne: vi.fn(async (_o: string, q: any) => {
+        const w = q?.where ?? {};
+        if (!account) return null;
+        const ok = Object.entries(w).every(([k, v]) => (account as any)[k] === v);
+        return ok ? account : null;
+      }),
+      update: vi.fn(async () => ({})),
+    });
+    const mgr = (engine: any, extra: any = {}) => {
+      const warn = vi.spyOn(console, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => {});
+      const m = new AuthManager({ secret: SECRET, baseUrl: 'http://localhost:3000', dataEngine: engine, ...extra });
+      warn.mockRestore();
+      return m;
+    };
+    const acct = (over: any = {}) => ({
+      id: 'a1', user_id: 'u1', provider_id: 'credential',
+      password: 'hash:current', previous_password_hashes: JSON.stringify(['hash:old1', 'hash:old2']),
+      ...over,
+    });
+
+    it('parseHashes tolerates null/garbage', () => {
+      const m = mgr(makeEngine(null));
+      expect((m as any).parseHashes(undefined)).toEqual([]);
+      expect((m as any).parseHashes('not json')).toEqual([]);
+      expect((m as any).parseHashes('["a","b"]')).toEqual(['a', 'b']);
+    });
+
+    it('is a no-op when history depth is 0', async () => {
+      const engine = makeEngine(acct());
+      const m = mgr(engine, { passwordHistoryCount: 0 });
+      await expect((m as any).assertPasswordNotReused('u1', 'current', stubVerify)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+      expect(engine.findOne).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('rejects reuse of the CURRENT password', async () => {
+      const m = mgr(makeEngine(acct()), { passwordHistoryCount: 5 });
+      await expect((m as any).assertPasswordNotReused('u1', 'current', stubVerify)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        body: { code: 'PASSWORD_REUSE' },
+      });
+    });
+
+    it('rejects reuse of a HISTORICAL password', async () => {
+      const m = mgr(makeEngine(acct()), { passwordHistoryCount: 5 });
+      await expect((m as any).assertPasswordNotReused('u1', 'old2', stubVerify)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        body: { code: 'PASSWORD_REUSE' },
+      });
+    });
+
+    it('accepts a fresh password and returns the current hash for the after-hook', async () => {
+      const m = mgr(makeEngine(acct()), { passwordHistoryCount: 5 });
+      await expect((m as any).assertPasswordNotReused('u1', 'brandnew', stubVerify)).resolves.toBe('hash:current');
+    });
+
+    it('recordPasswordHistory prepends the old hash, dedupes, and trims to the depth', async () => {
+      const engine = makeEngine(acct({ previous_password_hashes: JSON.stringify(['hash:old1', 'hash:old2']) }));
+      const m = mgr(engine, { passwordHistoryCount: 2 });
+      await (m as any).recordPasswordHistory('u1', 'hash:current');
+      const written = JSON.parse(engine.update.mock.calls[0][1].previous_password_hashes);
+      expect(written).toEqual(['hash:current', 'hash:old1']); // prepend + trim to 2
+    });
+  });
 });

packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.ts

@@ -294,6 +294,14 @@
   /** Minimum distinct character classes required (1-4). Default 3. */
   passwordMinClasses?: number;
 
+  /**
+   * ADR-0069 D1 — password history depth. When > 0, a password change/reset is
+   * rejected if the new password matches the current or any of the last
+   * `passwordHistoryCount` hashes (`sys_account.previous_password_hashes`).
+   * Reuses better-auth's native hash/verify — no bespoke crypto.
+   */
+  passwordHistoryCount?: number;
+
   /**
    * ADR-0069 D2 — better-auth-native per-IP rate limiting, passed through to
    * better-auth's core `rateLimit`. The settings bind tightens `customRules`
@@ -603,6 +611,24 @@
               (typeof ctx?.body?.newPassword === 'string' && ctx.body.newPassword) ||
               '';
             if (candidate) await this.assertPasswordComplexity(candidate);
+
+            // ── ADR-0069 D1: password history (reject reuse) ────────────
+            // change/reset only (sign-up has no prior history). Reuses
+            // better-auth's native password.verify — no bespoke crypto. Stashes
+            // the old hash so the after-hook appends it to the bounded ring on
+            // success.
+            if (
+              candidate &&
+              (ctx?.path === '/reset-password' || ctx?.path === '/change-password')
+            ) {
+              const userId = await this.resolvePasswordChangeUserId(ctx).catch(() => undefined);
+              if (userId) {
+                const pw = ctx?.context?.password;
+                const verify = typeof pw?.verify === 'function' ? pw.verify.bind(pw) : undefined;
+                const oldHash = await this.assertPasswordNotReused(userId, candidate, verify);
+                if (oldHash !== undefined) ctx.context.__osPwHistory = { userId, oldHash };
+              }
+            }
             // fall through to the path's own handling below
           }
 
@@ -802,6 +828,23 @@
             return;
           }
 
+          // ── ADR-0069 D1: commit password history on success ─────────
+          if (ctx?.path === '/change-password' || ctx?.path === '/reset-password') {
+            const stash = ctx?.context?.__osPwHistory;
+            if (stash?.userId) {
+              let succeeded = true;
+              try {
+                const { isAPIError } = await import('better-auth/api');
+                succeeded = !isAPIError(ctx?.context?.returned);
+              } catch {
+                succeeded = !(ctx?.context?.returned instanceof Error);
+              }
+              if (succeeded) await this.recordPasswordHistory(stash.userId, stash.oldHash);
+              delete ctx.context.__osPwHistory;
+            }
+            return;
+          }
+
           if (ctx?.path !== '/sign-up/email') return;
           const ep = ctx?.context?.options?.emailAndPassword;
           if (ep && ctx.context.__osDisableSignUpOrig !== undefined) {
@@ -2186,6 +2229,132 @@
     }
   }
 
+  /**
+   * ADR-0069 D1 — parse the bounded `previous_password_hashes` JSON column into
+   * a string[] of hashes, tolerating null / malformed values.
+   */
+  private parseHashes(raw: unknown): string[] {
+    if (typeof raw !== 'string' || !raw.trim()) return [];
+    try {
+      const arr = JSON.parse(raw);
+      return Array.isArray(arr) ? arr.filter((h): h is string => typeof h === 'string' && !!h) : [];
+    } catch {
+      return [];
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * ADR-0069 D1 — resolve the user whose password is being changed. For
+   * `/change-password` the caller is authenticated (session); for
+   * `/reset-password` the user is carried by the reset token's verification
+   * value (the same lookup better-auth's own handler uses).
+   */
+  private async resolvePasswordChangeUserId(ctx: any): Promise<string | undefined> {
+    if (ctx?.path === '/change-password') {
+      const { getSessionFromCtx } = await import('better-auth/api');
+      const sess: any = await getSessionFromCtx(ctx).catch(() => null);
+      return sess?.user?.id ?? sess?.session?.userId ?? undefined;
+    }
+    if (ctx?.path === '/reset-password') {
+      const token = typeof ctx?.body?.token === 'string' ? ctx.body.token : '';
+      if (!token) return undefined;
+      try {
+        const v: any = await ctx.context.internalAdapter.findVerificationValue(`reset-password:${token}`);
+        const raw = v?.value;
+        if (!raw) return undefined;
+        if (typeof raw === 'string') {
+          const t = raw.trim();
+          if (t.startsWith('{') || t.startsWith('"')) {
+            try {
+              const o = JSON.parse(t);
+              return (typeof o === 'string' ? o : o?.userId) ?? undefined;
+            } catch {
+              return t;
+            }
+          }
+          return t;
+        }
+        return raw?.userId ?? undefined;
+      } catch {
+        return undefined;
+      }
+    }
+    return undefined;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * ADR-0069 D1 — throw `PASSWORD_REUSE` when `candidate` matches the user's
+   * current password or any hash in the bounded history. Reuses better-auth's
+   * native `password.verify` (passed in) rather than re-hashing. Returns the
+   * current hash (for the after-hook to append) when the candidate is fresh, or
+   * undefined when the feature is off / nothing to compare.
+   */
+  private async assertPasswordNotReused(
+    userId: string,
+    candidate: string,
+    verify?: (data: { password: string; hash: string }) => Promise<boolean>,
+  ): Promise<string | undefined> {
+    const count = Math.floor(Number(this.config.passwordHistoryCount) || 0);
+    if (count <= 0 || typeof verify !== 'function') return undefined;
+    const engine = this.getDataEngine();
+    if (!engine) return undefined;
+    const SYSTEM_CTX = { isSystem: true, roles: [], permissions: [] };
+    let account: any;
+    try {
+      account = await engine.findOne('sys_account', {
+        where: { user_id: userId, provider_id: 'credential' },
+        fields: ['id', 'password', 'previous_password_hashes'],
+        context: SYSTEM_CTX,
+      } as any);
+    } catch {
+      return undefined; // fail-open on lookup error
+    }
+    if (!account?.id) return undefined;
+    const currentHash = typeof account.password === 'string' ? account.password : '';
+    const compareList = [currentHash, ...this.parseHashes(account.previous_password_hashes)].filter(Boolean);
+    for (const h of compareList) {
+      let match = false;
+      try { match = await verify({ password: candidate, hash: h }); } catch { match = false; }
+      if (match) {
+        const { APIError } = await import('better-auth/api');
+        throw new APIError('BAD_REQUEST', {
+          message: `For security you can't reuse one of your last ${count} passwords. Please choose a different one.`,
+          code: 'PASSWORD_REUSE',
+        });
+      }
+    }
+    return currentHash;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * ADR-0069 D1 — append `oldHash` to the bounded password-history ring after a
+   * successful change/reset. Best-effort; never throws.
+   */
+  private async recordPasswordHistory(userId: string, oldHash: string): Promise<void> {
+    const count = Math.floor(Number(this.config.passwordHistoryCount) || 0);
+    if (count <= 0 || !oldHash) return;
+    const engine = this.getDataEngine();
+    if (!engine) return;
+    try {
+      const SYSTEM_CTX = { isSystem: true, roles: [], permissions: [] };
+      const account = await engine.findOne('sys_account', {
+        where: { user_id: userId, provider_id: 'credential' },
+        fields: ['id', 'previous_password_hashes'],
+        context: SYSTEM_CTX,
+      } as any);
+      if (!account?.id) return;
+      const prev = this.parseHashes(account.previous_password_hashes);
+      const next = [oldHash, ...prev.filter((h) => h !== oldHash)].slice(0, count);
+      await engine.update(
+        'sys_account',
+        { id: account.id, previous_password_hashes: JSON.stringify(next) },
+        { context: SYSTEM_CTX } as any,
+      );
+    } catch {
+      // history maintenance is best-effort — never break a valid password change
+    }
+  }
+
   /**
    * ADR-0069 D2 — throw `ACCOUNT_LOCKED` when the identity is currently locked
    * out (brute-force protection). No-op when lockout is disabled

packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-plugin.test.ts

@@ -673,6 +673,21 @@ describe('AuthPlugin', () => {
       expect((manager as any).config.passwordRequireComplexity).toBeUndefined();
     });
 
+    it('binds password_history_count (ADR-0069 D1)', async () => {
+      const { manager } = await bootWithAuthSettings({ password_history_count: { value: 5, source: 'global' } });
+      expect((manager as any).config.passwordHistoryCount).toBe(5);
+    });
+
+    it('clamps password_history_count to a max of 24', async () => {
+      const { manager } = await bootWithAuthSettings({ password_history_count: { value: 99, source: 'global' } });
+      expect((manager as any).config.passwordHistoryCount).toBe(24);
+    });
+
+    it('applies an explicit password_history_count of 0 (feature off)', async () => {
+      const { manager } = await bootWithAuthSettings({ password_history_count: { value: 0, source: 'global' } });
+      expect((manager as any).config.passwordHistoryCount).toBe(0);
+    });
+
     it('binds account-lockout settings (ADR-0069 D2)', async () => {
       const { manager } = await bootWithAuthSettings({
         lockout_threshold: { value: 5, source: 'global' },

packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-plugin.ts

@@ -506,6 +506,11 @@ export class AuthPlugin implements Plugin {
           const n = asPositiveInt(values.password_min_classes);
           if (n !== undefined) patch.passwordMinClasses = Math.min(4, Math.max(1, n));
         }
+        if (isExplicit('password_history_count')) {
+          // 0 disables → use a non-negative reader (asPositiveInt rejects 0).
+          const n = Math.floor(Number(values.password_history_count));
+          if (Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0) patch.passwordHistoryCount = Math.min(24, n);
+        }
 
         // Session lifetime — days → seconds for better-auth's `session`
         // (`expiresIn` = absolute lifetime; `updateAge` = refresh threshold).

packages/services/service-settings/src/manifests/auth.manifest.test.ts

@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ describe('authSettingsManifest', () => {
     expect(byKey('lockout_duration_minutes').default).toBe(15);
     expect(byKey('rate_limit_max').default).toBe(10);
     expect(byKey('rate_limit_window_seconds').default).toBe(60);
+    expect(byKey('password_history_count').default).toBe(0);
   });
 
   it('exposes encrypted Google OAuth credential fields', () => {

packages/services/service-settings/src/manifests/auth.manifest.ts

@@ -106,6 +106,17 @@ const manifest = {
       description: 'How many of the four classes (upper / lower / digit / symbol) a password must include.',
       visible: "${data.email_password_enabled !== false && data.password_require_complexity === true}",
     },
+    {
+      type: 'number',
+      key: 'password_history_count',
+      label: 'Password history (no reuse)',
+      required: false,
+      default: 0,
+      min: 0,
+      max: 24,
+      description: 'Block reusing this many previous passwords on change/reset. 0 disables the check.',
+      visible: "${data.email_password_enabled !== false}",
+    },
 
     {
       type: 'group',