fix: prevent path traversal during plugin extraction

[jcj46548-ux]

Summary

• validate zip entry paths before extracting plugin packages
• reject parent-directory and backslash paths so entries cannot escape the target working directory
• preserve normal nested file extraction, including packages with explicit directory entries

Tests

• go test ./pkg/plugin_packager/decoder ./pkg/plugin_packager/packager

Notes:

• go test ./pkg/plugin_packager is blocked locally because pkg/license/private_key/PRIVATE_KEY.pem is not present in the checkout.
• go test -race ./pkg/plugin_packager/decoder is blocked locally because the current Go environment has cgo disabled.

[gemini-code-assist]

Code Review

This pull request refactors the ZIP extraction logic in ZipPluginDecoder to prevent path traversal vulnerabilities (Zip Slip) by introducing path validation helpers (safeExtractPath and pathIsInside) and adds corresponding unit tests. The review feedback suggests wrapping the file reader in an io.LimitReader to protect against Zip Bomb attacks, and explicitly checking for .. in the path validation to ensure robust path traversal prevention.

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[gemini-code-assist]

The current path traversal validation checks if entryPath starts with ../ using strings.HasPrefix(entryPath, "../"). However, if entryPath is exactly .. (which can happen if the entry name is .. or resolves to it via path.Clean), it will bypass this check because it does not start with ../. While pathIsInside will eventually catch and reject it, it is safer, more explicit, and more efficient to reject .. directly in the first validation block.

Suggested change

	if entryPath == "." ||
	path.IsAbs(entryPath) ||
	strings.HasPrefix(entryPath, "../") ||
	strings.Contains(entryPath, "/../") ||
	strings.Contains(entryPath, `\`) ||
	filepath.IsAbs(filepath.FromSlash(entryPath)) {
	if entryPath == "." ||
	entryPath == ".." ||
	path.IsAbs(entryPath) ||
	strings.HasPrefix(entryPath, "../") ||
	strings.Contains(entryPath, "/../") ||
	strings.Contains(entryPath, `\\`) ||
	filepath.IsAbs(filepath.FromSlash(entryPath)) {

[fatelei]

 func safeExtractPath(dst, entryName string) (string, error) {
  	if entryName == "" || strings.Contains(entryName, `\`) {
  		return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", errUnsafeZipPath, entryName)
  	}

  	for _, part := range strings.Split(entryName, "/") {
  		if part == ".." {
  			return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", errUnsafeZipPath, entryName)
  		}
  	}

  	entryPath := path.Clean(entryName)
  	if entryPath == "." || path.IsAbs(entryPath) {
  		return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", errUnsafeZipPath, entryName)
  	}

  	targetPath := filepath.Join(dst, filepath.FromSlash(entryPath))
  	if !pathIsInside(dst, targetPath) {
  		return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", errUnsafeZipPath, entryName)
  	}

  	return targetPath, nil
  }

[fatelei]

not check targetPath := filepath.Join(dst, filepath.FromSlash(entryPath))
if !pathIsInside(dst, targetPath) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", errUnsafeZipPath, entryName)
} ?