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Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to v2.18.9 [SECURITY] (main) - #58

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Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to v2.18.9 [SECURITY] (main)#58
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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind (source) 2.18.3 → 2.18.9 age adoption passing confidence
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind (source) 2.13.5 → 2.18.9 age adoption passing confidence
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind (source) 2.15.2 → 2.18.9 age adoption passing confidence

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jackson-databind has an array subtype allowlist bypass in BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator (allowIfSubTypeIsArray)

CVE-2026-54513 / GHSA-rmj7-2vxq-3g9f

More information

Details

Summary

BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist.

Impact

Applications using BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() as a safeguard get no protection for concrete array component types; an attacker controlling JSON can instantiate non-allowlisted types via an array wrapper, re-opening the gadget-instantiation risk PTV is meant to prevent.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains)
  • 2.18 line: >= 2.10.0, < 2.18.8 -> fixed in 2.18.8
  • 2.19-2.21 line: >= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4

PolymorphicTypeValidator was added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.

Severity / CWE

Maintainer: significant. Reporter: HIGH. CWE-184 (Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs); related CWE-502.

Upstream fix

FasterXML/jackson-databind#5981; fix PR #​5983 (24529da), 2.18 backport PR #​5984 (01d1692). Released 2026-06-04 in 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind has a PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass via generic type parameters that allows arbitrary class instantiation

CVE-2026-54512 / GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm

More information

Details

jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV.

If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization.

An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list.

This is the same vulnerability class responsible for the historical sequence of jackson-databind deserialization CVEs; here it manifests as a validator bypass rather than a missing deny-list entry.

Impact
  • Bypass of the PTV allow-list, including the recommended BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator configured with name-prefix allow rules.
  • Arbitrary class instantiation of any type assignable to the container's element/parameter position, with attacker-controlled property values (setter/field injection).
  • Potential unauthenticated remote code execution when a class with exploitable side effects (JNDI lookup, JDBC/connection-pool gadgets,TemplatesImpl-style loaders, etc.) is present on the classpath.

Applications that accept untrusted JSON and rely on a configured PTV — the documented, security-conscious configuration — are affected.

Proof of Concept

Configuration restricting polymorphic deserialization to a single safe container:

BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()
        .allowIfSubType("java.util.ArrayList")
        .build();

ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()
        .polymorphicTypeValidator(ptv)
        .build();

Malicious payload (Wrapper.value is Object with @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS, include = As.WRAPPER_ARRAY)):

{"value":["java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.EvilGadget>",[{"cmd":"calc.exe"}]]}

On vulnerable versions, com.evil.EvilGadget is instantiated and its cmd property is set, despite only java.util.ArrayList being allow-listed. On 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4 the deserialization throws InvalidTypeIdException before instantiation.

Variant payloads (all bypass an ArrayList/HashMap allow-list):

Type ID Smuggled type position
java.util.ArrayList<Evil> list element
java.util.HashMap<Evil,String> map key
java.util.HashMap<String,Evil> map value
java.util.ArrayList<java.util.ArrayList<Evil>> nested element
java.util.ArrayList<Evil[]> array element
Patches

Fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4 and 3.1.4 via the changes for FasterXML/jackson-databind#5988, commit 434d6c511. The fix adds recursive validation of each non-trivial type parameter (and array element types appearing as parameters) through the full PTV chain, with documented exemptions for Object (wildcard resolution) and Enum types.

PolymorphicTypeValidator was added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind: @​JsonIgnore on a Record property is bypassed with a PropertyNamingStrategy

CVE-2026-59888 / GHSA-3pjw-73gf-8qr5

More information

Details

Summary

For Java Records, POJOPropertiesCollector._removeUnwantedIgnorals() records a @JsonIgnore-annotated component under its original implicit name before _renameUsing() applies the PropertyNamingStrategy. After the rename, _ignoredPropertyNames still holds only the pre-rename name, so _ignorableProps is built from the stale key. The renamed JSON key passes IgnorePropertiesUtil.shouldIgnore() and is assigned to the Record's constructor parameter, defeating the @JsonIgnore.

Impact

A Record using a naming strategy that relies on @JsonIgnore to keep an internal/privileged component out of deserialization can have that component set from the wire via its renamed key (e.g. a role/flag controlled by an untrusted client).

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains)
  • 2.15-2.18 line: >= 2.15.0, < 2.18.8 -> fixed in 2.18.8 (backport c7c6783)
  • 2.19-2.21 line: >= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4 (#​5974, baa2cdf)
Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: Moderate. CWE-915; related CWE-345.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind: InetSocketAddress deserialization triggers eager DNS resolution (SSRF)

CVE-2026-54514 / GHSA-hgj6-7826-r7m5

More information

Details

Summary

JDKFromStringDeserializer constructed InetSocketAddress with new InetSocketAddress(host, port), which performs eager DNS name resolution for hostname inputs at deserialization time. An application that binds untrusted JSON into a type containing an InetSocketAddress field issues an attacker-chosen DNS query during readValue, before any application-level validation or connect logic. The fix uses InetSocketAddress.createUnresolved(host, port), deferring DNS to an explicit connect.

Impact

An attacker controlling JSON deserialized into an InetSocketAddress-bearing type can force outbound DNS lookups for attacker-chosen hostnames at deserialization time (SSRF / DNS-based out-of-band interaction / internal-resolver probing), purely from binding.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains on 1f5a103)
  • 2.18 line: >= 2.18.0, < 2.18.8 -> fixed in 2.18.8
  • 2.19-2.21 line: >= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4
Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: LOW. CWE-918 (SSRF).

Upstream fix

FasterXML/jackson-databind#5951 ("Improve InetSocketAddress deserialization"). Released 2026-06-04 in 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind has a PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass via generic type parameters that allows arbitrary class instantiation

CVE-2026-54512 / GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm

More information

Details

jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV.

If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization.

An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list.

This is the same vulnerability class responsible for the historical sequence of jackson-databind deserialization CVEs; here it manifests as a validator bypass rather than a missing deny-list entry.

Impact
  • Bypass of the PTV allow-list, including the recommended BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator configured with name-prefix allow rules.
  • Arbitrary class instantiation of any type assignable to the container's element/parameter position, with attacker-controlled property values (setter/field injection).
  • Potential unauthenticated remote code execution when a class with exploitable side effects (JNDI lookup, JDBC/connection-pool gadgets,TemplatesImpl-style loaders, etc.) is present on the classpath.

Applications that accept untrusted JSON and rely on a configured PTV — the documented, security-conscious configuration — are affected.

Proof of Concept

Configuration restricting polymorphic deserialization to a single safe container:

BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()
        .allowIfSubType("java.util.ArrayList")
        .build();

ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()
        .polymorphicTypeValidator(ptv)
        .build();

Malicious payload (Wrapper.value is Object with @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS, include = As.WRAPPER_ARRAY)):

{"value":["java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.EvilGadget>",[{"cmd":"calc.exe"}]]}

On vulnerable versions, com.evil.EvilGadget is instantiated and its cmd property is set, despite only java.util.ArrayList being allow-listed. On 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4 the deserialization throws InvalidTypeIdException before instantiation.

Variant payloads (all bypass an ArrayList/HashMap allow-list):

Type ID Smuggled type position
java.util.ArrayList<Evil> list element
java.util.HashMap<Evil,String> map key
java.util.HashMap<String,Evil> map value
java.util.ArrayList<java.util.ArrayList<Evil>> nested element
java.util.ArrayList<Evil[]> array element
Patches

Fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4 and 3.1.4 via the changes for FasterXML/jackson-databind#5988, commit 434d6c511. The fix adds recursive validation of each non-trivial type parameter (and array element types appearing as parameters) through the full PTV chain, with documented exemptions for Object (wildcard resolution) and Enum types.

PolymorphicTypeValidator was added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind has an array subtype allowlist bypass in BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator (allowIfSubTypeIsArray)

CVE-2026-54513 / GHSA-rmj7-2vxq-3g9f

More information

Details

Summary

BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist.

Impact

Applications using BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() as a safeguard get no protection for concrete array component types; an attacker controlling JSON can instantiate non-allowlisted types via an array wrapper, re-opening the gadget-instantiation risk PTV is meant to prevent.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains)
  • 2.18 line: >= 2.10.0, < 2.18.8 -> fixed in 2.18.8
  • 2.19-2.21 line: >= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4

PolymorphicTypeValidator was added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.

Severity / CWE

Maintainer: significant. Reporter: HIGH. CWE-184 (Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs); related CWE-502.

Upstream fix

FasterXML/jackson-databind#5981; fix PR #​5983 (24529da), 2.18 backport PR #​5984 (01d1692). Released 2026-06-04 in 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind: @​JsonView ypassed for @​JsonUnwrapped container properties on deserialization

CVE-2026-59889 / GHSA-5gvw-p9qm-jgwh

More information

Details

Summary

UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrapped() replays the buffered JSON for a @JsonUnwrapped property by iterating its properties and calling prop.deserializeAndSet() with no prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) guard — the exact guard processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() received in the #​5971 / GHSA-rcqc-6cw3-h962 fix, and the guard BeanDeserializer.deserializeWithUnwrapped applies to directly-matched properties. As a result, a property annotated with both @JsonView(PrivilegedView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is written from attacker JSON even when deserializing under a more-restrictive active view.

Correction to the original framing (runtime-verified): the gap is NOT a per-field inner @JsonView (the unwrapped sub-object's own BeanDeserializer gates inner fields correctly). The unchecked gate is the view of the unwrapped CONTAINER property.

Intent proof (runtime, 2.x HEAD 21dd70dd and 3.x HEAD 7a5939d6)

An @JsonView(AdminView) property that is NOT @JsonUnwrapped → null under PublicView (correctly gated). The identical property WITH @JsonUnwrapped → fully populated (bypass). The fix the creator path already received, not applied to the regular-property method.

Impact — write-side mass-assignment / privilege escalation

@JsonView is commonly used as a write-side authorization guard: a public endpoint binds the body under readerWithView(PublicView.class) and groups privileged state in a nested object whose container property is @JsonView(AdminView). When that property is @JsonUnwrapped, an untrusted caller mass-assigns it. PoC: a self-service registration where AccountFlags{role,approved,creditBalance} is @JsonView(AdminView) @&#8203;JsonUnwrapped; attacker JSON {role:ADMIN,approved:true,creditBalance:1000000} under PublicView binds all three → approved admin with arbitrary balance. The failing gate is a WRITE gate, hence integrity-high (C:N/I:H/A:N); no worse than the C:L/I:L parent and arguably higher as @JsonView-as-write-guard is the exact use case #​5971/#​5969 defended.

Affected
  • com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind 2.x: confirmed bypass at 21dd70dd (== released 2.21.4 / 2.22.0 line; includes the #​5973 backport). DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSION default=true.
  • tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind 3.x: confirmed bypass at HEAD 7a5939d6 (latest 3.x). DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSION default=false → the stock-config repro is the common shape where privileged inner fields are individually @JsonView(PublicView) and the developer relies on the container @JsonView(AdminView); the 3.x PoC mass-assigns role/approved/creditBalance under PublicView. (The other simultaneous report's PoC was reportedly fixed on 3.x; this distinct container-property path is not.)
Additive variants (runtime-confirmed both branches; all closed by the same one-line guard)
  • nested @JsonUnwrapped (unwrapped-in-unwrapped) — recursive bypass.
  • merge / readerWithView(...).withValueToUpdate(...) (PATCH/partial-update) — bypass; non-unwrapped merge control gates correctly.
  • builder-based deserializer (@JsonDeserialize(builder=...)) — BuilderBasedDeserializer routes through the same processUnwrapped.
  • Honest non-findings: read-side serialization correctly honors views (no leak); @JsonAnySetter+view and @JsonTypeInfo+@JsonUnwrapped are separate/unsupported behaviors, not this bug.
Fix

Add prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) (when MapperFeature.DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSION/active-view applies) to the processUnwrapped() property loop, mirroring processUnwrappedCreatorProperties(). One change closes the impact PoC + all three variants across BeanDeserializer and BuilderBasedDeserializer. Full runnable PoCs (2.x + 3.x) + variant harnesses available on request.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind has case-insensitive deserialization bypasses per-property @​JsonIgnoreProperties

CVE-2026-54515 / GHSA-5jmj-h7xm-6q6v

More information

Details

Summary

In BeanDeserializerBase.createContextual(), per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties exclusions are applied by _handleByNameInclusion(), producing a contextual deserializer whose BeanPropertyMap has the ignored properties removed. The subsequent per-property case-insensitivity block (triggered by @JsonFormat(ACCEPT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_PROPERTIES)) rebuilds from this._beanProperties (the original, unfiltered map) instead of contextual._beanProperties, then overwrites the filtered map — restoring every property _handleByNameInclusion had just removed. The ignored property becomes writable again.

Impact

An application that both enables case-insensitive matching and relies on per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties to keep a field unwritable can have that field set from untrusted JSON (mass-assignment-style write).

Affected / Patched

Will be fixed in 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1 and 3.1.4.

Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: Moderate. CWE-915.

Upstream fix

FasterXML/jackson-databind#5962 (PR #​5964, 0e1b0b2), milestone 3.1.4. Released 2026-06-04.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind: @JsonView bypass for creator properties with @JsonTypeInfo(include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY)

GHSA-mhm7-754m-9p8w

More information

Details

Summary

In BeanDeserializer.deserializeUsingPropertyBasedWithExternalTypeId, the active-view (@JsonView) filter was applied only to the regular bean-property branch; the creator-property branch performed no creatorProp.visibleInView(activeView) check. A constructor parameter annotated with both @JsonView(RestrictedView.class) and @JsonTypeInfo(use=Id.NAME, include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY) is populated from attacker JSON even when a more restrictive view is active.

This is a patch gap. GHSA-5hh8 (CVE-2026-54517) and GHSA-rcqc (CVE-2026-54518) descriptions cover only the main property-based path and the unwrapped-creator path respectively; the external-type-id creator path was fixed on the 3.x line via #​6004 ("Extend #​5969/#​5971 fixes to ... external-type-id case in regular BeanDeserializer", commit 7dc7a17, 2026-05-22) but
the fix was never backported to 2.21 or 2.18. Users on 2.21.4 and 2.18.8 who upgraded per the published advisories remain vulnerable to the same @JsonView bypass technique via a different code path.

Vulnerable Code Path

File: com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/BeanDeserializer.java
Method: deserializeUsingPropertyBasedWithExternalTypeId

On 2.21.4 (and 2.18.8), the creator-property branch (around line 1125-1158) checks creatorProp.isInjectionOnly() and hands off to ext.handlePropertyValue(...) / buffer.assignParameter(...) without ever consulting visibleInView(activeView):

 if (creatorProp != null) {
     // [databind#1381]: if useInput=FALSE, skip deserialization from input
     if (creatorProp.isInjectionOnly()) { ... }
     // NO visibleInView(activeView) CHECK HERE
     if (!ext.handlePropertyValue(p, ctxt, propName, null)) {
         if (buffer.assignParameter(creatorProp, ...)) { ... }
     }
     continue;
 }

On 3.1.4, the same branch contains the additional guard (commit 7dc7a17):

  if (creatorProp != null) {
     // [databind#5971]: must honor active view here too
     if ((activeView != null) && !creatorProp.visibleInView(activeView)) {
         p.skipChildren();
         continue;
     }
     ...
 }

The 2.21 and 2.18 backport PRs (#​6005 and #​6003) only backported the main-path fixes from #​5969/#​5971; the external-type-id fix from #​6004 was not backported. The maintainer closed #​6005
with "got changes merged forward, looks like it's all covered now", but the forward-merge did not include the ExtTypeId creator branch.

Proof of Concept

Compiles and runs against jackson-databind 2.21.4:

  import com.fasterxml.jackson.annotation.*;
  import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;

  public class JsonViewExternalTypeIdBypass {
      public static class PublicView {}
      public static class AdminView extends PublicView {}

      public static abstract class Asset { public String name; }
      public static class PublicAsset extends Asset {}
      public static class AdminAsset extends Asset { public String secret; }

      public static class Container {
          @&#8203;JsonTypeInfo(use = JsonTypeInfo.Id.NAME,
                  include = JsonTypeInfo.As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY,
                  property = "kind")
          @&#8203;JsonSubTypes({
              @&#8203;JsonSubTypes.Type(value = PublicAsset.class, name = "pub"),
              @&#8203;JsonSubTypes.Type(value = AdminAsset.class,  name = "admin")
          })
          @&#8203;JsonView(AdminView.class)
          public Asset asset;

          public String label;

          @&#8203;JsonCreator
          public Container(
                  @&#8203;JsonProperty("label") String label,
                  @&#8203;JsonProperty("asset") @&#8203;JsonView(AdminView.class) Asset asset) {
              this.label = label;
              this.asset = asset;
          }
      }

      public static class Wrapper {
          @&#8203;JsonView(PublicView.class)
          public Container data;
      }

      public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
          // Admin-only "asset" should be blocked when reading with PublicView
          String json = "{\"data\":{\"label\":\"hello\",\"kind\":\"admin\","
                      + "\"asset\":{\"name\":\"foo\",\"secret\":\"LEAKED\"}}}";

          ObjectMapper om = new ObjectMapper();
          Wrapper r = om.readerWithView(PublicView.class)
                  .forType(Wrapper.class)
                  .readValue(json);

          System.out.println(r.data);
          // Actual on 2.21.4:   Container{label='hello', asset=AdminAsset{name='foo', secret='LEAKED'}}
          // Expected (secure):  Container{label='hello', asset=null}
          if (r.data.asset != null && r.data.asset instanceof AdminAsset) {
              System.out.println("[!!] BYPASS CONFIRMED — admin-only asset populated under PublicView");
          }
      }
  }

A control case that removes include = As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY (forcing the normal property-based path) correctly returns asset = null, confirming the bypass is specific to the ExternalTypeId
code path and not a misconfiguration.

Impact

View-restricted (e.g. admin-only) creator properties can be populated from untrusted input where @​JsonView is used as a write-side authorization boundary. Typical victims are Spring Boot
REST controllers that use @​JsonView(PublicView.class) on the request body to whitelist user-settable fields — an attacker can inject the restricted creator parameter (including choosing
the polymorphic subtype via the sibling kind/type-id property) by combining it with a polymorphic @​JsonTypeInfo(EXTERNAL_PROPERTY) annotation on the same field.

  • CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization)
  • Same impact class as CVE-2026-54517 / CVE-2026-54518
  • No RCE, no DoS — this is an access-control / mass-assignment bypass
Trigger Conditions

Developer code must combine (no opt-in user configuration required):

  1. Property-based @​JsonCreator on the outer type
  2. A creator parameter annotated with @​JsonView(RestrictedView.class)
  3. The same parameter annotated with @​JsonTypeInfo(use=Id.NAME, include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY, property="...")

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind: Deeply nested JsonNode throws StackOverflowError for toString()

CVE-2026-50193 / GHSA-3wrr-7qpf-2prh

More information

Details

Impact

Potential Denial-of-Service when attacker sends deeply nested JSON if (and only if) service:

  1. Reads deeply nested (1000s of levels) JSON as JsonNode (ObjectMapper.readTree())
  2. Writes out same (or modifided) node using JsonNode.toString()

which can consume significant amount of resources with concurrent relatively small requests (1000 nested arrays is 2kB).

Patches

Fixed in 2.14.0 via https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/3447.

Workarounds

Avoid serializing JsonNode using toString(): use ObjectMapper.writeValueAsString(node)

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate.

@renovatebot-confluentinc
renovatebot-confluentinc Bot force-pushed the renovate/main-maven-com.fasterxml.jackson.core-jackson-databind-vulnerability branch from e254754 to 13e19a0 Compare July 2, 2026 21:56
@renovatebot-confluentinc renovatebot-confluentinc Bot changed the title Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to v2.19.0 [SECURITY] (main) Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to v2.18.8 [SECURITY] (main) Jul 2, 2026
@renovatebot-confluentinc
renovatebot-confluentinc Bot force-pushed the renovate/main-maven-com.fasterxml.jackson.core-jackson-databind-vulnerability branch from 13e19a0 to e1d8c2d Compare July 20, 2026 21:21
@renovatebot-confluentinc renovatebot-confluentinc Bot changed the title Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to v2.18.8 [SECURITY] (main) Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to v2.18.9 [SECURITY] (main) Jul 20, 2026
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