Document the experimental Auths predecessor

README.md

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 # Auths
 
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> This repository is the experimental predecessor to the current
+> [Auths](https://auths.dev) implementation. Experimental `0.1.x` packages
+> were published from this project, but it was not released as the supported
+> Auths v1 product. The current implementation supersedes it and is developed
+> in [auths-dev/auths-proof](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof), whose
+> repository name is a temporary coordinate. This repository remains available
+> as research history and prior art; new adopters should start at
+> [auths.dev](https://auths.dev). See the
+> [migration and deferral ledger](docs/PREDECESSOR_MIGRATION_LEDGER.md).
+
 [![CI](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
 [![Verify Commits](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths/actions/workflows/verify-commits.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths/actions/workflows/verify-commits.yml?query=branch%3Amain+event%3Apush)
 

docs/PREDECESSOR_MIGRATION_LEDGER.md

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+# Auths predecessor migration and deferral ledger
+
+**Status:** Historical evidence inventory for the experimental
+`auths-dev/auths` predecessor
+
+**Current product:** [Auths](https://auths.dev)
+
+**Current implementation:**
+[auths-dev/auths-proof](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof), whose
+repository name remains a temporary coordinate
+
+**Governing decisions:**
+[public naming consolidation](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/issues/54),
+[human approval and custody specification](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/docs/specs/0029-human-approval-and-custody.md),
+and [Phase 11 custody deferral](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/issues/59)
+
+## Purpose
+
+This ledger prevents two opposite mistakes: losing useful research from this
+repository, or treating experimental predecessor code as assurance evidence
+for the current Auths implementation.
+
+The current project is intentionally identity-method agnostic. Nothing in this
+ledger imports the predecessor's KERI coupling, broad signing APIs, storage
+architecture, or platform assumptions. “Migrated” means a requirement or
+bounded contract has an identified current owner. It does not mean predecessor
+source was copied or that a deployable provider passed production gates.
+
+## Dispositions
+
+| Area | Predecessor evidence | Current disposition | Current authority | Remaining gate |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Secure Enclave | [`SecureEnclaveBridge.swift`](../crates/auths-core/swift/SecureEnclaveBridge.swift) demonstrates P-256 key creation, opaque key handles, public-key export, LocalAuthentication user presence, and signing. | **Contract migrated; implementation deferred.** The current design preserves opaque non-exportable keys and user presence, but replaces unchecked Rust FFI with a bounded, versioned helper-process protocol. | [AP-SPEC-029 sections 6.3 and 12](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/docs/specs/0029-human-approval-and-custody.md) | [Issue #59](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/issues/59): helper protocol, hostile-message tests, Secure Enclave provider, restart/invalidation, packaging, recovery, and security review. |
+| Custody and keychain | [`crates/auths-core/src/storage`](../crates/auths-core/src/storage) contains macOS/iOS keychain, Linux Secret Service, Windows Credential Manager, PKCS#11, encrypted-file, memory, and Secure Enclave work. Some platform paths are experimental or stubs. | **Provider-neutral boundary migrated; platform providers deferred.** Current `auths-custody` owns exact transaction-bound external signing and no private keys. It does not adopt the predecessor storage abstraction wholesale. | [`auths-custody`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/main/product/integrations/auths-custody) and [AP-SPEC-029 sections 6.1, 6.4–6.6](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/docs/specs/0029-human-approval-and-custody.md) | [Issue #59](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/issues/59): capability discovery, explicit fallback, software/headless providers, native macOS/Linux/Windows evidence, lifecycle, and zeroization review. |
+| Storage | The predecessor combines identity records, key material, alias indexes, passphrase caching, encrypted files, and operating-system stores behind storage interfaces. | **Requirements selectively preserved; architecture not migrated.** The current project keeps protocol/core semantics free of storage and makes custody an external product integration. Any future persistent provider must begin from its own threat model and narrow contract. | [AP-SPEC-029 ownership and non-goals](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/docs/specs/0029-human-approval-and-custody.md) and [`auths-author`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/main/core/crates/auths-author) | [Issue #59](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/issues/59): protected persistence, corruption handling, rotation, backup, recovery, uninstall, and platform assessment. |
+| Signing workflow | [`signing.rs`](../crates/auths-sdk/src/workflows/signing.rs) explores agent-first, hardware, and passphrase-backed signing fallbacks for commits and tags. | **Exact-request construction migrated; general workflow retired.** Current `auths-author` constructs domain-separated external signing requests and `auths-custody` rejects transaction substitution. The predecessor's general commit-signing path and silent fallback shape are not current product APIs. | [`auths-author`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/main/core/crates/auths-author), [`auths-custody`](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/tree/main/product/integrations/auths-custody), and [AP-SPEC-029](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/blob/main/docs/specs/0029-human-approval-and-custody.md) | [Issue #59](https://github.com/auths-dev/auths-proof/issues/59): bounded provider implementation, cancellation/unavailability behavior, exact approval binding, explicit fallback, and scoped security review. |
+
+## What this ledger does not claim
+
+- The predecessor implementation is not part of the current release-candidate
+  source closure.
+- The Swift bridge, platform stores, and signing workflow are not current
+  production-custody evidence.
+- Published predecessor `0.1.x` packages are not deleted, reclaimed, or
+  rewritten by this notice.
+- The current repository is not coupled to KERI or any other single identity
+  method.
+- Touch ID and other biometrics indicate operating-system-mediated user
+  presence; they are not Auths identities and no biometric material belongs in
+  Auths.
+- This notice does not authorize repository archival, renaming, package
+  yanking, publication, native binary distribution, or a production security
+  claim.
+
+## Reuse rule
+
+Future work may study the predecessor as prior art, but every reused idea must
+enter through the current owner boundary, a bounded pull request, current
+tests, packaging evidence, and the applicable review gate. Historical code is
+an input to design—not a shortcut around current assurance requirements.