Do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability.
Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories:
If you can't use that form, email leonardo.aa88@gmail.com with gombit security in the subject.
Please include:
- affected version (
gombit version --short) or commit; - the component — framework runtime, CLI/generator, generated application code, or the admin SPA;
- reproduction steps or a proof of concept;
- impact as you see it.
| Stage | Target |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgement | 3 business days |
| Initial assessment | 10 business days |
| Fix or mitigation plan | depends on severity; communicated in the assessment |
| Public disclosure | coordinated, up to 90 days from the report |
We'll credit you in the advisory and release notes unless you'd rather stay anonymous.
Gombit is pre-1.0. Fixes land on main and ship in the next release; there are
no long-term support branches.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
0.1.x |
✅ |
< 0.1 (unreleased main before the first tag) |
❌ |
Pre-1.0 minor versions may contain breaking changes. Pin an exact version and read the CHANGELOG before upgrading.
In scope — vulnerabilities in this repository:
- the framework runtime (
framework,auth,admin,database,config,contract,cache); - authentication and session handling, including the cookie/CSRF mode
(
docs/auth-cookie.md) and admin permission enforcement; - the admin SPA under
/admin/(internal/adminui); - the CLI and generators, including code that
gombit newandgombit make resourceemit — an insecure default in generated output is a vulnerability in Gombit; - the release pipeline and published artifacts.
Out of scope:
- misconfiguration of an application you generated — for example running with
a weak or shared
GOMBIT_JWT_SECRET, disabling CSRF protection, or exposing/docsin production.gombit doctorflags several of these; VITE_*environment variables. By design everything underVITE_*is compiled into the frontend bundle and is public. Putting a secret there is a configuration error, not a framework vulnerability (build plan §5);- vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies without a demonstrated impact on Gombit — report those upstream, though we're glad to hear about them;
- findings from automated scanners with no accompanying exploitability analysis;
- denial of service via unbounded self-inflicted load (for example running the dev server on a public interface).
The threat models for the areas most likely to matter are documented rather than implicit:
- Bearer JWT and token handling:
docs/auth.md— the access token is held in memory, neverlocalStorage; - cookie/session auth and the CSRF double-submit design:
docs/auth-cookie.md; - admin permissions, groups, and the superuser bypass:
docs/admin.md; - configuration, including which values are redacted by
gombit config show:docs/config.md.
Release archives ship with SHA256SUMS.txt:
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS.txt --ignore-missingSee docs/installation.md.