CAPIG XSS (Meta Conversions API Gateway) postMessage origin ...

src/pentesting-web/postmessage-vulnerabilities/README.md

@@ -247,6 +247,44 @@ For **more information**:
 - Link to page about [**XSS**](../xss-cross-site-scripting/index.html)
 - Link to page about [**client side prototype pollution to XSS**](../deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/index.html#client-side-prototype-pollution-to-xss)
 
+### Origin-derived script loading & supply-chain pivot (CAPIG case study)
+
+`capig-events.js` only registered a `message` handler when `window.opener` existed. On `IWL_BOOTSTRAP` it checked `pixel_id` but stored `event.origin` and later used it to build `${host}/sdk/${pixel_id}/iwl.js`.
+
+<details>
+<summary>Handler writing attacker-controlled origin</summary>
+
+```javascript
+if (window.opener) {
+  window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
+    if (
+      !localStorage.getItem("AHP_IWL_CONFIG_STORAGE_KEY") &&
+      !localStorage.getItem("FACEBOOK_IWL_CONFIG_STORAGE_KEY") &&
+      event.data.msg_type === "IWL_BOOTSTRAP" &&
+      checkInList(g.pixels, event.data.pixel_id) !== -1
+    ) {
+      localStorage.setItem("AHP_IWL_CONFIG_STORAGE_KEY", {
+        pixelID: event.data.pixel_id,
+        host: event.origin,
+        sessionStartTime: event.data.session_start_time,
+      })
+      startIWL() // loads `${host}/sdk/${pixel_id}/iwl.js`
+    }
+  })
+}
+```
+
+</details>
+
+**Exploit (origin → script-src pivot):**
+1. Get an opener: e.g., in Facebook Android WebView reuse `window.name` with `window.open(target, name)` so the window becomes its own opener, then post a message from a malicious iframe.
+2. Send `IWL_BOOTSTRAP` from any origin to persist `host = event.origin` in `localStorage`.
+3. Host `/sdk/<pixel_id>/iwl.js` on any CSP-allowed origin (takeover/XSS/upload on a whitelisted analytics domain). `startIWL()` then loads attacker JS in the embedding site (e.g., `www.meta.com`), enabling credentialed cross-origin calls and account takeover.
+
+If direct opener control was impossible, compromising a third-party iframe on the page still allowed sending the crafted `postMessage` to the parent to poison the stored host and force the script load.
+
+**Backend-generated shared script → stored XSS:** the plugin `AHPixelIWLParametersPlugin` concatenated user rule parameters into JS appended to `capig-events.js` (e.g., `cbq.config.set(...)`). Injecting breakouts like `"]}` injected arbitrary JS, creating stored XSS in the shared script served to all sites loading it.
+
 ### Trusted-origin allowlist isn't a boundary
 
 A strict `event.origin` check only works if the **trusted origin cannot run attacker JS**. When privileged pages embed third-party iframes and assume `event.origin === "https://partner.com"` is safe, any XSS in `partner.com` becomes a bridge into the parent:
@@ -314,6 +352,7 @@ iframe.location = fbMsg // sends postMessage from facebook.com with forged callb
 - [https://dev.to/karanbamal/how-to-spot-and-exploit-postmessage-vulnerablities-36cd](https://dev.to/karanbamal/how-to-spot-and-exploit-postmessage-vulnerablities-36cd)
 - [Leaking fbevents: OAuth code exfiltration via postMessage trust leading to Instagram ATO](https://ysamm.com/uncategorized/2026/01/16/leaking-fbevents-ato.html)
 - To practice: [https://github.com/yavolo/eventlistener-xss-recon](https://github.com/yavolo/eventlistener-xss-recon)
+- [CAPIG postMessage origin trust → script loading + stored JS injection](https://ysamm.com/uncategorized/2025/01/13/capig-xss.html)
 - [Self XSS Facebook Payments](https://ysamm.com/uncategorized/2026/01/15/self-xss-facebook-payments.html)
 - [Facebook JavaScript SDK Math.random callback prediction → DOM XSS writeup](https://ysamm.com/uncategorized/2026/01/17/math-random-facebook-sdk.html)
 - [V8 Math.random() state recovery (Z3 predictor)](https://github.com/PwnFunction/v8-randomness-predictor)