Merge pull request #89 from pyrycode/feature/47

feat(relay): wire per-IP rate-limit middleware on /v1/server + /v1/client (#47)

Author: ilmoniemi

cmd/pyrycode-relay/main.go

@@ -29,7 +29,11 @@ func main() {
 		certCache      = flag.String("cert-cache", defaultCertCache(), "Directory for autocert's TLS certificate cache.")
 		insecureListen = flag.String("insecure-listen", "", "Listen address for plain HTTP (e.g. :8080). Disables autocert; use only when fronted by a reverse proxy.")
 		metricsListen  = flag.String("metrics-listen", "127.0.0.1:9090", "Listen address for the /metrics endpoint. Must be a loopback IP literal (e.g. 127.0.0.1:9090, [::1]:9090). Empty disables.")
-		showVersion    = flag.Bool("version", false, "Print version and exit.")
+		trustXFF       = flag.Bool("trust-x-forwarded-for", false,
+			"Trust the X-Forwarded-For header as the source IP for per-IP rate limiting. "+
+				"WARNING: enabling this without a trusted reverse proxy in front of the relay "+
+				"allows clients to spoof their source IP and bypass per-IP rate limits.")
+		showVersion = flag.Bool("version", false, "Print version and exit.")
 	)
 	flag.Parse()
 
@@ -121,12 +125,33 @@ func main() {
 	// four orders of magnitude below nhooyr's 32 MiB default).
 	const maxFrameBytes int64 = 256 * 1024
 
+	// Per-IP rate-limit policy: ~10 attempts/IP/minute steady-state, burst
+	// 20. Derivation: docs/threat-model.md § DoS resistance future-hardening
+	// line names ~10/min/IP and burst headroom for retry storms; the 5-min
+	// eviction sweep keeps the bucket map's resident size bounded under
+	// address-space scanning (docs/specs/architecture/50-ip-rate-limiter.md
+	// § Adversarial walk). All three values must be positive — NewIPRateLimiter
+	// panics on a zero/negative evictionInterval via time.NewTicker.
+	const (
+		rateLimitRefillEvery      = 6 * time.Second
+		rateLimitBurst            = 20
+		rateLimitEvictionInterval = 5 * time.Minute
+	)
+	limiter := relay.NewIPRateLimiter(rateLimitRefillEvery, rateLimitBurst, rateLimitEvictionInterval)
+	// Best-effort: the current listener block calls os.Exit on error, which
+	// skips defers. A real graceful-shutdown path (signal handler + server
+	// Shutdown) is out of scope per #47; this defer runs on clean returns
+	// (e.g. --version above does not reach here, but future test entry
+	// points might).
+	defer limiter.Close()
+	rateLimit := relay.NewRateLimitMiddleware(limiter, logger, *trustXFF)
+
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 	mux.Handle("/healthz", relay.NewHealthzHandler(reg, Version, startedAt))
-	mux.Handle("/v1/server", relay.ServerHandler(reg, logger, 30*time.Second, maxFrameBytes))
+	mux.Handle("/v1/server", rateLimit(relay.ServerHandler(reg, logger, 30*time.Second, maxFrameBytes)))
 	// maxPhones=16 caps phones per server-id; over-cap registrations are
 	// rejected with WS close 4429. Per #30 architect spec.
-	mux.Handle("/v1/client", relay.ClientHandler(reg, logger, maxFrameBytes, 16))
+	mux.Handle("/v1/client", rateLimit(relay.ClientHandler(reg, logger, maxFrameBytes, 16)))
 
 	if *insecureListen != "" {
 		logger.Info("starting", "version", Version, "mode", "insecure", "listen", *insecureListen)

docs/knowledge/INDEX.md

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ One-line pointers into the evergreen knowledge base. Newest entries at the top o
 
 ## Features
 
+- [Per-IP rate-limit middleware (`/v1/server` + `/v1/client`)](features/rate-limit-middleware.md) — HTTP middleware that throttles WS upgrade attempts per source IP **before** `websocket.Accept` runs, before the registry is touched, before the mobile/binary token header is read. One new exported symbol: `relay.NewRateLimitMiddleware(limiter *IPRateLimiter, logger *slog.Logger, trustForwardedFor bool) func(http.Handler) http.Handler` — returns the conventional composition shape, matching `EnforceHost`. Per request: extract `ip := ClientIP(r, trustForwardedFor)`, deny on `ip == ""` (empty-IP guard runs **before** `Allow` because the limiter's `Allow("")` is a normal map key, not a deny — loud-failure rule: refuse un-attributable traffic rather than admit it un-throttled), deny on `!limiter.Allow(ip)`, otherwise `next.ServeHTTP`. Both deny paths emit one `logger.Warn("rate_limited", "remote", strconv.Quote(ip))` line — single allowlisted key, `strconv.Quote` defends against control-byte log injection, the empty-IP case renders `remote="\"\""` so operators can distinguish the two deny causes by the value. 429 body is empty (`http.Error(w, "", http.StatusTooManyRequests)` — matches the existing `BadRequest` shape in `server_endpoint.go` / `client_endpoint.go`, no internal state leaked). New `--trust-x-forwarded-for` CLI flag (default `false`, Usage carries the explicit spoofing warning) is threaded once into the factory. Policy lives at the wiring site in `cmd/pyrycode-relay/main.go`: `rateLimitRefillEvery = 6s`, `rateLimitBurst = 20`, `rateLimitEvictionInterval = 5min` → ~10 sustained attempts/IP/min with 20-attempt burst headroom; `5min` sweep is well above `burst*refillEvery = 120s`. One shared `*IPRateLimiter` is applied to both `mux.Handle` registrations — a misbehaving IP retrying against either endpoint shares one bucket; `/healthz` is intentionally NOT wrapped (must remain pollable from monitoring). `defer limiter.Close()` is best-effort (current `os.Exit` listener path skips defers; graceful shutdown out of scope). Concurrency safety fully delegated to the limiter; middleware is stateless, no new locks, no new goroutines. Mobile/binary `X-Pyrycode-Token` structurally not read on this code path. Why middleware not constructor injection: keeps frame-routing handlers ignorant of admission control, makes `/healthz`'s exemption fall out for free, mirrors `EnforceHost`. Closes the third leg of `docs/threat-model.md` § *DoS resistance* alongside #29 (per-frame size cap) and #30 (per-server-id phone cap); the "token-bucket rate limit on /v1/server and /v1/client" line moves from *Future hardening* to v1 mitigation. Out of scope: connection-count cap (different threat surface — *attempt rate* vs *resident count*), CIDR-aware trusted-proxy chain (today's flag is flat all-or-nothing), multi-instance shared-state (would need Redis), rate-limit metrics counter (future ticket parallel to #58), adaptive policy, graceful-shutdown signal handler (#47).
 - [Metrics listener (localhost-only)](features/metrics-listener.md) — separate `*http.Server` for `/metrics`, bound to a loopback IP literal (default `127.0.0.1:9090`); kept off the internet-exposed public listener that serves `/healthz` + `/v1/{server,client}` because metric values leak operational state. Two exports + one sentinel in `internal/relay/metrics_listen.go`: `ErrNonLoopbackBind` (branchable via `errors.Is`), `CheckLoopbackBind(addr)` (pure validator — `net.SplitHostPort` → `ListenerPort` for the port-0 / range / format rejects inherited from #81 → `net.ParseIP(host).IsLoopback()`; hostnames including `localhost:9090` are rejected even when they currently resolve to loopback — the DNS-time TOCTOU window is closed structurally, not by re-resolving), and `NewMetricsServer(addr, h)` (opt-out-aware: `addr == ""` → `(nil, nil)`, validator failure → `(nil, err)`, otherwise an `*http.Server` with the public listener's four timeouts duplicated literally so either listener can drift independently in a future ticket). Wired into both listener branches in `cmd/pyrycode-relay/main.go`: a goroutine launch mirroring the autocert mode's http-01 listener pattern (`os.Exit(1)` on `ListenAndServe` failure — loud-fail-over-silent because a relay booted with metrics enabled but silently not serving them would mislead operator scrapes), the metrics port joins **both** the `expected` and `actual` sets of #81's allowlist (declared secondary listener — must land on both sides of the asymmetric check). Empty-flag opt-out is structural via `metricsSrv != nil` guards at every reference site — no repeated `if *metricsListen == "" {}` branches. TLS / authn deliberately out of scope (loopback IS the defence); same-host adversary in scope but not a defence target; graceful shutdown deferred to #31. Three tests in `metrics_listen_test.go` — 12-row validator matrix, 3-row constructor matrix with timeouts pinned to literal values (not a shared constant), and an end-to-end happy-path that drives validator + constructor + `net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")` + actual `http.Get` round-trip by exploiting `http.Server.Serve(l)` ignoring `Addr` once a listener is supplied (#60).
 - [Listener port allowlist (boot-time refusal)](features/listener-port-allowlist.md) — relay refuses to start (exit 2) if the set of TCP ports it is *about to bind* (`http.Server.Addr` values) contains any port outside an explicit expected set derived from parsed flags: `{443, 80}` in autocert mode, `{<port>}` in `--insecure-listen :<port>` mode. Catches stray `net/http/pprof :6060` listeners, env-flipped debug ports, accidentally-enabled metrics exporters. Three exports from `internal/relay/listeners.go`: `ErrUnexpectedListener` sentinel (branchable via `errors.Is`; wrapped message names surplus + expected ports both ascending so the failure log is deterministic across `map`-iteration runs and grep-friendly), `ListenerPort(addr string) (uint16, error)` parsing `":443"` / `"127.0.0.1:8080"` / `"[::1]:443"` with an explicit reject of port 0 (the ephemeral-placeholder trap — would smuggle an unknown bound port past the actual-set construction), and `CheckListenerPorts(expected, actual map[uint16]struct{}) error` (pure set-difference). **Asymmetric by design**: surplus = error, missing = nil (a failure to bind an expected port surfaces as `ListenAndServe`'s own bind error at exit 1; duplicating the signal at boot would clutter logs). **Port-only**: interface binding (`127.0.0.1` vs `0.0.0.0`) intentionally out of scope on a single-instance internet-exposed deploy. **Reports all surplus in one error** so a manifest enabling several debug surfaces fails in one boot rather than N restart cycles. Wired into each listener branch separately in `cmd/pyrycode-relay/main.go` (different `http.Server` shapes; lifting a helper would invent surface area without a second consumer); structured log fields `unexpected_ports` + `expected_ports` recomputed in `main` via unexported `listenerPortLists` so `Check…` stays a single-error return. Paired with `TestBinaryDoesNotImportPprof` in `cmd/pyrycode-relay/deps_test.go` — shells out to `go list -deps -json`, catches the `import _ "net/http/pprof"` handler-registration variant that attaches `/debug/pprof/*` to `http.DefaultServeMux` *without* opening a new port (the runtime check would miss it). Belt-and-suspenders means different fabric: stochastic-ish runtime guard + deterministic compile-time test, neither alone is complete. Exit 2 = config-rejected-at-boot, harmonised across the sentinel family (architect overrode the AC's literal `os.Exit(1)`) (#81).
 - [Env-var config validator (boot-time refusal)](features/env-config-validator.md) — table-driven validation of every env var the relay reads at boot. Single source of truth is the unexported `envContracts []envContract` registry in `internal/relay/env_config.go`; each row carries `name`, `required` bool, and an inline `validate func(string) error`. `CheckEnvConfig(lookup func(string) (string, bool)) error` walks the registry and returns the structured `*ErrInvalidConfig{Key, Reason}` on the first failure (`Reason` is `"missing"` or `"malformed-value: <err>"`); the package-level sentinel `ErrInvalidConfigSentinel` is matched via a custom `Is` method (not `Unwrap`, which would double-print the message prefix) so `errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidConfigSentinel)` and `errors.As(err, &cfgErr)` form a dual contract. The `func(string) (string, bool)` (= `os.LookupEnv` shape) getter coexists with #77's `func(string) string` getter — the presence bit is necessary here to distinguish "missing-but-required" from "present-but-empty", semantically inert for `IsProductionMode`'s exact-`"1"` match. **Ordering is load-bearing**: wired in `main.go` BEFORE `CheckInsecureListenInProduction` so a typo like `PYRYCODE_RELAY_PRODUCTION=true` cannot slip through `IsProductionMode`'s silent-non-production fallback and reach the insecure-listen guard with an unvalidated value. Today's registry has one row (`PYRYCODE_RELAY_PRODUCTION`, optional-but-format-validated); future env-var reads register here at code-review time. `checkEnvConfigWith(lookup, contracts)` is the parameterised inner used by the `required: true` test case (today's production table has no required entries). Exit 2 = config-rejected-at-boot, matching the sibling refusals (#9, #77, #79) (#80).