diff --git a/docs/guides/dns-rebinding-protection.md b/docs/guides/dns-rebinding-protection.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..88437a921
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/guides/dns-rebinding-protection.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+# DNS Rebinding Protection
+
+The MCP Python SDK includes DNS rebinding protection to prevent DNS rebinding attacks. While this improves security, it may cause existing setups to fail with a **421 Misdirected Request / Invalid Host Header** error if the host header doesn't match the allowed list.
+
+This commonly occurs when using:
+- Reverse proxies (Nginx, Caddy, etc.)
+- API gateways
+- Custom domains
+- Docker/Kubernetes networking
+
+## Resolving the Error
+
+Depending on your security requirements, you can resolve this in two ways:
+
+### Option 1: Explicitly Allow Specific Hosts (Recommended for Production)
+
+Use this approach if you are running in production or through a gateway. You can wildcard the ports using `*`.
+
+```python
+from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
+from mcp.server.transport_security import TransportSecuritySettings
+
+mcp = FastMCP(
+    "MyServer",
+    transport_security=TransportSecuritySettings(
+        enable_dns_rebinding_protection=True,
+        # Add your specific gateway or domain here
+        allowed_hosts=["localhost:*", "127.0.0.1:*", "your-gateway-host:*"],
+        allowed_origins=["http://localhost:*", "http://your-gateway-host:*"],
+    )
+)
+```
+
+### Option 2: Disable DNS Rebinding Protection (Development Only)
+
+Use this approach for local development or if you are managing security at a different layer of your infrastructure.
+
+```python
+from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
+from mcp.server.transport_security import TransportSecuritySettings
+
+mcp = FastMCP(
+    "MyServer",
+    transport_security=TransportSecuritySettings(
+        enable_dns_rebinding_protection=False,
+    )
+)
+```
+
+## Common Scenarios
+
+### Using with Nginx
+
+If you're using Nginx as a reverse proxy, ensure it's passing the correct headers:
+
+```nginx
+location / {
+    proxy_pass http://localhost:8000;
+    proxy_set_header Host $host;
+    proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
+    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
+}
+```
+
+And configure your MCP server to allow the Nginx host:
+
+```python
+allowed_hosts=["localhost:*", "your-domain.com:*"]
+```
+
+### Using with Docker
+
+When running in Docker, you may need to allow the container hostname:
+
+```python
+allowed_hosts=["localhost:*", "127.0.0.1:*", "mcp-server:*"]
+```
+
+## Security Considerations
+
+- **Production**: Always use Option 1 with explicit host allowlisting
+- **Development**: Option 2 is acceptable for local testing
+- **Never** disable DNS rebinding protection in production environments exposed to the internet
+
+## Related Issues
+
+- Original implementation: [#861](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/pull/861)
+- Common errors: [#1797](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/issues/1797)
diff --git a/src/mcp/shared/auth.py b/src/mcp/shared/auth.py
index ca5b7b45a..583acc9b2 100644
--- a/src/mcp/shared/auth.py
+++ b/src/mcp/shared/auth.py
@@ -71,7 +71,10 @@ def validate_scope(self, requested_scope: str | None) -> list[str] | None:
         if requested_scope is None:
             return None
         requested_scopes = requested_scope.split(" ")
-        allowed_scopes = [] if self.scope is None else self.scope.split(" ")
+        # When no scope is required (None), allow all requested scopes
+        if self.scope is None:
+            return requested_scopes
+        allowed_scopes = self.scope.split(" ")
         for scope in requested_scopes:
             if scope not in allowed_scopes:  # pragma: no branch
                 raise InvalidScopeError(f"Client was not registered with scope {scope}")
diff --git a/test_validate_scope_fix.py b/test_validate_scope_fix.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bb84f42e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test_validate_scope_fix.py
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+"""Test for validate_scope fix when self.scope is None"""
+import pytest
+from mcp.shared.auth import ClientRegistration, InvalidScopeError
+
+
+def test_validate_scope_with_none_scope_allows_all():
+    """When client has no scope restriction (None), all requested scopes should be allowed."""
+    client = ClientRegistration(
+        client_id="test-client",
+        client_secret="secret",
+        scope=None,  # No scope restriction
+        redirect_uris=["http://localhost/callback"],
+    )
+    
+    # Should not raise - all scopes allowed when no restriction
+    result = client.validate_scope("read write admin")
+    assert result == ["read", "write", "admin"]
+
+
+def test_validate_scope_with_empty_requested_returns_none():
+    """When requested_scope is None, return None."""
+    client = ClientRegistration(
+        client_id="test-client",
+        client_secret="secret",
+        scope="read write",
+        redirect_uris=["http://localhost/callback"],
+    )
+    
+    result = client.validate_scope(None)
+    assert result is None
+
+
+def test_validate_scope_with_restrictions_enforced():
+    """When client has scope restrictions, only allowed scopes pass."""
+    client = ClientRegistration(
+        client_id="test-client",
+        client_secret="secret",
+        scope="read write",
+        redirect_uris=["http://localhost/callback"],
+    )
+    
+    # Allowed scope
+    result = client.validate_scope("read")
+    assert result == ["read"]
+    
+    # Disallowed scope should raise
+    with pytest.raises(InvalidScopeError):
+        client.validate_scope("admin")