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2 | 2 |
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3 | 3 | > Your AI agent has your credentials. This gives it rules. |
4 | 4 |
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5 | | -Policy, audit, kill switch for OpenClaw agents, AI work assistants, and any bot with access to your accounts. |
| 5 | +Policy, audit, kill switch for any AI agent with access to your accounts. |
6 | 6 |
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7 | 7 | [](https://www.npmjs.com/package/declawed) |
8 | 8 | [](./LICENSE) |
9 | | -[](#) |
| 9 | +[](#) |
10 | 10 |
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11 | 11 | ### OpenClaw sales bot — declawed |
12 | 12 |
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@@ -68,6 +68,93 @@ const result2 = await shield.task('export all contacts to CSV') |
68 | 68 |
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69 | 69 | That's it. Every `shield.task()` call is policy-checked, audited, and budgeted. |
70 | 70 |
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| 71 | +## Common Use Cases |
| 72 | + |
| 73 | +People give agents their passwords every day. Here's what they're afraid of — and how `declawed` fixes it. |
| 74 | + |
| 75 | +### 1. LinkedIn Sales Agent (OpenClaw) |
| 76 | + |
| 77 | +**The fear:** Your bot has your LinkedIn password. It's supposed to read your inbox and check messages. But what if it starts mass-connecting, exporting contacts, or changing your profile? |
| 78 | + |
| 79 | +**With declawed:** |
| 80 | + |
| 81 | +```yaml |
| 82 | +agent: linkedin-sales-bot |
| 83 | +rules: |
| 84 | + allow: |
| 85 | + - "read*" |
| 86 | + - "list*" |
| 87 | + - "check*" |
| 88 | + - "search*" |
| 89 | + deny: |
| 90 | + - "*send*" |
| 91 | + - "*connect*" |
| 92 | + - "*export*" |
| 93 | + - "*settings*" |
| 94 | + - "*password*" |
| 95 | +default: deny |
| 96 | +expire_after: 60min |
| 97 | +max_actions: 50 |
| 98 | +``` |
| 99 | + |
| 100 | +Read inbox, check messages — allowed. Mass-connect, export contacts — blocked before it starts. |
| 101 | + |
| 102 | +### 2. Email & Calendar Assistant |
| 103 | + |
| 104 | +**The fear:** Your assistant has your Gmail. It reads your calendar and summarizes emails. But what if it deletes messages, forwards sensitive emails externally, or changes your billing settings? |
| 105 | + |
| 106 | +**With declawed:** |
| 107 | + |
| 108 | +```yaml |
| 109 | +agent: daily-briefing |
| 110 | +rules: |
| 111 | + allow: |
| 112 | + - "read*" |
| 113 | + - "list*" |
| 114 | + - "check*" |
| 115 | + - "summarize*" |
| 116 | + deny: |
| 117 | + - "*delete*" |
| 118 | + - "*forward*" |
| 119 | + - "*billing*" |
| 120 | + - "*settings*" |
| 121 | + - "*password*" |
| 122 | +default: deny |
| 123 | +expire_after: 30min |
| 124 | +max_actions: 100 |
| 125 | +``` |
| 126 | + |
| 127 | +Read calendar, list emails, summarize threads — allowed. Delete, forward, change settings — blocked. |
| 128 | + |
| 129 | +### 3. CRM Data Entry Bot |
| 130 | + |
| 131 | +**The fear:** Your bot updates Salesforce records from your email threads. But what if it bulk-deletes contacts, exports your pipeline, or modifies deal values? |
| 132 | + |
| 133 | +**With declawed:** |
| 134 | + |
| 135 | +```yaml |
| 136 | +agent: crm-updater |
| 137 | +rules: |
| 138 | + allow: |
| 139 | + - "read*" |
| 140 | + - "update*" |
| 141 | + - "list*" |
| 142 | + - "search*" |
| 143 | + deny: |
| 144 | + - "*delete*" |
| 145 | + - "*export*" |
| 146 | + - "*bulk*" |
| 147 | + - "*admin*" |
| 148 | + - "*billing*" |
| 149 | +default: deny |
| 150 | +expire_after: 45min |
| 151 | +max_actions: 200 |
| 152 | +``` |
| 153 | + |
| 154 | +Read records, update fields, search contacts — allowed. Bulk-delete, export pipeline, admin changes — blocked. |
| 155 | + |
| 156 | +--- |
| 157 | + |
71 | 158 | ## How It Protects You |
72 | 159 |
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73 | 160 | Your credentials live in AnchorBrowser, not in your code. Your agent never sees your password — it gets a scoped, ephemeral session, and declawed controls what it can do. |
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