test(auth): cover OTP exchange, lockout, rotation, and token verification

Adds behavioral tests for exchangeTempAuthCode/verifyAuthToken covering
the happy-path exchange + code rotation + replay rejection, the
5-attempt lockout, TTL expiry, token verification, and the underlying
crypto-token primitives (timingSafeEqual, randomDigits, randomToken).

Removes plans/007-auth-otp-tests.md now that the plan is implemented
and marks it DONE in plans/README.md.

Author: antfubot

packages/devframe/src/node/auth/__tests__/state.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+import { randomDigits, randomToken, timingSafeEqual } from 'devframe/utils/crypto-token'
+import { createSharedState } from 'devframe/utils/shared-state'
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+import {
+  exchangeTempAuthCode,
+  getTempAuthCode,
+  refreshTempAuthCode,
+  verifyAuthToken,
+} from '../state'
+
+function makeStorage() {
+  return createSharedState({ initialValue: { trusted: {} as Record<string, any> } }) as any
+}
+function makeSession() {
+  return { meta: {} } as any
+}
+const INFO = { ua: 'test-ua', origin: 'http://localhost' }
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  refreshTempAuthCode()
+})
+
+describe('exchangeTempAuthCode', () => {
+  it('exchanges a valid code for a token, trusts the session, and rotates the code', () => {
+    const storage = makeStorage()
+    const session = makeSession()
+    const code = getTempAuthCode()
+    const token = exchangeTempAuthCode(code, session, INFO, storage)
+    expect(token).toBeTruthy()
+    expect(session.meta.isTrusted).toBe(true)
+    expect(session.meta.clientAuthToken).toBe(token)
+    expect(storage.value().trusted[token!]).toMatchObject({ authToken: token, origin: INFO.origin })
+    // Code is rotated so it can't be replayed.
+    expect(getTempAuthCode()).not.toBe(code)
+    // The now-stale code no longer works.
+    expect(exchangeTempAuthCode(code, makeSession(), INFO, storage)).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('rotates the code after 5 failed attempts', () => {
+    const storage = makeStorage()
+    const code = getTempAuthCode()
+    const wrong = code === '000000' ? '111111' : '000000'
+    for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++)
+      expect(exchangeTempAuthCode(wrong, makeSession(), INFO, storage)).toBeNull()
+    // Code rotated by the lockout — the original valid code is now dead.
+    expect(getTempAuthCode()).not.toBe(code)
+    expect(exchangeTempAuthCode(code, makeSession(), INFO, storage)).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('rejects and rotates an expired code', () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers()
+    try {
+      refreshTempAuthCode()
+      const code = getTempAuthCode()
+      vi.advanceTimersByTime(5 * 60_000 + 1) // past TEMP_AUTH_CODE_TTL
+      const storage = makeStorage()
+      expect(exchangeTempAuthCode(code, makeSession(), INFO, storage)).toBeNull()
+      expect(getTempAuthCode()).not.toBe(code)
+    }
+    finally {
+      vi.useRealTimers()
+    }
+  })
+})
+
+describe('verifyAuthToken', () => {
+  it('verifies a known token and rejects an unknown one', () => {
+    const storage = makeStorage()
+    const token = exchangeTempAuthCode(getTempAuthCode(), makeSession(), INFO, storage)!
+    const session = makeSession()
+    expect(verifyAuthToken(token, session, storage)).toBe(true)
+    expect(session.meta.isTrusted).toBe(true)
+    expect(verifyAuthToken('not-a-real-token', makeSession(), storage)).toBe(false)
+  })
+})
+
+describe('crypto-token', () => {
+  it('timingSafeEqual: equal for identical, false for different length/content', () => {
+    expect(timingSafeEqual('abc', 'abc')).toBe(true)
+    expect(timingSafeEqual('abc', 'abd')).toBe(false)
+    expect(timingSafeEqual('abc', 'abcd')).toBe(false)
+  })
+  it('randomDigits returns the requested length of decimal digits', () => {
+    const d = randomDigits(6)
+    expect(d).toHaveLength(6)
+    expect(d).toMatch(/^\d{6}$/)
+  })
+  it('randomToken returns hex of the expected length', () => {
+    expect(randomToken(16)).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/)
+  })
+})

plans/007-auth-otp-tests.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ changes are allowed as long as they're marked).
 | 004 | Stop git argument injection via `ref`/`hash` | security/bug | P1 | S | — | TODO |
 | 005 | Don't cache a rejected RPC `setup()` promise | bug | P1 | S | — | TODO |
 | 006 | Bound `SharedState.syncIds` (memory leak) | bug | P1 | S | — | DONE |
-| 007 | Behavioral tests for the auth/OTP trust boundary | tests | P1 | S | — | TODO |
+| 007 | Behavioral tests for the auth/OTP trust boundary | tests | P1 | S | — | DONE |
 | 008 | Cap hub terminal buffer + reject restart-after-terminate | bug | P2 | S | — | TODO |
 | 009 | Fix two server-side streaming lifecycle leaks | bug | P2 | S-M | — | TODO |
 | 010 | Initialize client shared state once across trust flips | bug | P2 | S | — | TODO |