diff --git a/token/token.go b/token/token.go
index 5d2dd521152..0803574d5fc 100644
--- a/token/token.go
+++ b/token/token.go
@@ -23,8 +23,23 @@ const (
 	appAUDHeader               = "CF-Access-Aud"
 	AccessLoginWorkerPath      = "/cdn-cgi/access/login"
 	AccessAuthorizedWorkerPath = "/cdn-cgi/access/authorized"
+	cloudflareAccessSuffix     = ".cloudflareaccess.com"
 )
 
+// isCloudflareAccessHost reports whether host is a Cloudflare Access team
+// hostname (*.cloudflareaccess.com). Used by GetAppInfo to verify that a
+// response carrying CF-Access-Domain / CF-Access-Aud values actually came
+// from the Cloudflare Access edge rather than from whatever host the user
+// originally invoked cloudflared against.
+func isCloudflareAccessHost(host string) bool {
+	// Drop a trailing port if present.
+	if i := strings.IndexByte(host, ':'); i >= 0 {
+		host = host[:i]
+	}
+	host = strings.ToLower(host)
+	return strings.HasSuffix(host, cloudflareAccessSuffix) && len(host) > len(cloudflareAccessSuffix)
+}
+
 var (
 	userAgent     = "DEV"
 	signatureAlgs = []jose.SignatureAlgorithm{jose.RS256}
@@ -385,6 +400,15 @@ func GetAppInfo(reqURL *url.URL) (*AppInfo, error) {
 	var aud string
 	location := resp.Request.URL
 	if strings.Contains(location.Path, AccessLoginWorkerPath) {
+		// The redirect chain stopped at a URL whose path matches the
+		// AccessLoginWorkerPath substring. That predicate alone does not
+		// guarantee the response actually came from Cloudflare — any host can
+		// expose a /cdn-cgi/access/login path. Verify the host belongs to the
+		// Cloudflare Access edge (*.cloudflareaccess.com) before treating
+		// CF-Access-Domain and the ?kid= query parameter as authoritative.
+		if !isCloudflareAccessHost(location.Hostname()) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("AppInfo redirect endpoint served by non-Cloudflare host %q; refusing to trust response headers", location.Hostname())
+		}
 		aud = resp.Request.URL.Query().Get("kid")
 		if aud == "" {
 			return nil, errors.New("Empty app aud")
diff --git a/token/token_test.go b/token/token_test.go
index da92ed73a02..facd538094c 100644
--- a/token/token_test.go
+++ b/token/token_test.go
@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ package token
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/url"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 )
 
@@ -133,3 +135,62 @@ func TestJwtPayloadUnmarshal_FailsWhenAudIsOmitted(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("Expected %v, got %v", wantErr, err)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestIsCloudflareAccessHost(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		host string
+		want bool
+	}{
+		{"team.cloudflareaccess.com", true},
+		{"team.cloudflareaccess.com:8443", true},
+		{"TEAM.cloudflareaccess.com", true},
+		{"sub.team.cloudflareaccess.com", true},
+		{"cloudflareaccess.com", false},
+		{".cloudflareaccess.com", false},
+		{"attacker.com", false},
+		{"127.0.0.1", false},
+		{"127.0.0.1:8080", false},
+		{"cloudflareaccess.com.attacker.com", false},
+		{"team-cloudflareaccess.com", false},
+		{"", false},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		if got := isCloudflareAccessHost(c.host); got != c.want {
+			t.Errorf("isCloudflareAccessHost(%q) = %v, want %v", c.host, got, c.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGetAppInfo_RejectsRedirectFromNonCloudflareHost(t *testing.T) {
+	// Stand up a server that mimics the attacker shape: a HEAD to /
+	// redirects to /cdn-cgi/access/login?kid=AUD on the same host, which
+	// returns 200 with CF-Access-Domain set. Without host validation, the
+	// (AppDomain, AppAUD) fields would come from this attacker-controlled
+	// response. With host validation, GetAppInfo must refuse it.
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.URL.Path == "/" {
+			http.Redirect(w, r, "/cdn-cgi/access/login?kid=AUD123", http.StatusFound)
+			return
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, AccessLoginWorkerPath) {
+			w.Header().Set(appDomainHeader, "victim-app.example.com")
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+			return
+		}
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	reqURL, err := url.Parse(srv.URL + "/")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse server URL: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	appInfo, err := GetAppInfo(reqURL)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetAppInfo accepted response from non-Cloudflare host; got appInfo=%+v", appInfo)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "non-Cloudflare host") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected non-Cloudflare host error, got: %v", err)
+	}
+}