diff --git a/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/manual-deobfuscation.md b/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/manual-deobfuscation.md
index 196da6dd6df..4b8d090aa8d 100644
--- a/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/manual-deobfuscation.md
+++ b/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/manual-deobfuscation.md
@@ -120,6 +120,53 @@ Outputs are the collected return values per invocation; useful for bulk string/c
 
 A recurring Android malware pattern is a **small Java stub + stripped JNI loader + high-entropy asset**. If the APK contains a native library with one abnormally large JNI export, encrypted strings, and an `assets/` blob that doesn't match its file extension, you can usually recover the next stage **without executing the sample**.<sup>[[7]](#references)</sup>
 
+#### Repair hostile APK and DEX metadata before decompiling
+
+Treat an APK as an **adversarial ZIP**, not as a trustworthy filesystem tree. List members before extraction and reject absolute paths, normalized paths that escape the output directory, and file/directory collisions. A sample can remain installable while crafted names make extractors omit entries, crash, or write outside the analysis directory.<sup>[[8]](#references)[[11]](#references)</sup>
+
+A DEX parser error also does **not** prove that the bytecode is encrypted. Compare the header and `map_list` against the actual layout: section sizes must fit inside `file_size`, fixed-width tables must be aligned, indexes must stay within their target tables, and `string_data`, `class_data`, and `code_item` references must decode consistently. A packer can swap map type labels or point table entries at valid-but-wrong data so a disassembler follows the attacker's metadata instead of the real structures.<sup>[[9]](#references)[[11]](#references)</sup>
+
+Useful repairs on a disposable copy are:<sup>[[9]](#references)[[11]](#references)</sup>
+
+- Rebuild incorrect map entries from structurally valid candidate sections instead of trusting the declared type/offset pair.
+- Replace a junk `code_item.debug_info_off` with `0` when debugging data is nonessential; `0` explicitly means that no debug information exists.
+- Parse only through the DEX header's declared `file_size`, but carve any trailing overlay for separate analysis; triage invalid references in unreachable methods separately from reachable code.
+- After patching offsets or instructions, update `file_size`/map values as needed and recompute the DEX SHA-1 signature and Adler-32 checksum before reopening it in strict tools.
+
+#### Recover indexed native string oracles and encrypted assets
+
+When most Java strings are calls such as `nativeGetStr(int)`, enumerate the integer call sites and reverse the single JNI routine as a **string oracle**.<sup>[[8]](#references)[[11]](#references)</sup> In a stripped native library, the fixed AES S-box and Rcon tables identify AES; a nonce/counter block plus an incrementing counter distinguishes CTR-like use from ECB/CBC.<sup>[[11]](#references)</sup> Preserve the exact counter layout and endianness when reimplementing it, then iterate all valid indexes to recover configuration, asset names, permission strings, and payload parameters in bulk.<sup>[[11]](#references)</sup>
+
+Apply recovered cipher parameters to high-entropy, extensionless assets offline and validate the plaintext independently rather than trusting a successful decrypt. For an embedded APK, check ZIP integrity and its signing metadata:<sup>[[8]](#references)[[11]](#references)</sup>
+
+```bash
+file stage2.bin
+unzip -t stage2.bin
+apksigner verify --verbose --print-certs stage2.bin
+```
+
+#### Reconstruct DPT-Shell method bodies
+
+DPT-Shell hollows DEX method implementations and reconstructs them at runtime.<sup>[[10]](#references)</sup> Strong fingerprints are a small `ProxyApplication`/`JniBridge` stub, `assets/OoooooOooo`, and a native loader below `assets/vwwwwwvwww/` for each ABI.<sup>[[10]](#references)[[11]](#references)</sup> Repair deceptive DEX table offsets **before** resolving method indexes; otherwise valid code-store records will be mapped to the wrong methods.<sup>[[11]](#references)</sup>
+
+The upstream writer and runtime parser define the code store as little-endian records:<sup>[[10]](#references)</sup>
+
+```text
+u16 version
+u16 dex_count
+u32 dex_section_offset[dex_count]
+for each DEX section:
+    u16 method_count
+    repeat method_count times:
+        u32 method_idx
+        u32 instruction_size_bytes
+        u8  instructions[instruction_size_bytes]
+```
+
+For each DEX section, use `method_idx` as an index into that file's `method_ids`, locate the method's `code_item`, and restore its `insns[]` bytes.<sup>[[10]](#references)[[11]](#references)</sup> Keep DEX instruction units in mind: `code_item.insns_size` counts 16-bit code units whereas the external store records a byte length. Validate every offset/length against the store boundary, then regenerate the DEX signature/checksum after patching.<sup>[[9]](#references)[[10]](#references)</sup>
+
+Also inspect nominal image resources instead of assuming they are decoration. For PNGs, concatenate `IDAT` chunks in file order, decompress the zlib stream, and compare its expected scanline length with the actual output; unexplained trailing data or additional streams can be another code/payload carrier.<sup>[[11]](#references)</sup>
+
 #### OLLVM-style native XOR string recovery
 
 A common native pattern is a one-time init block that decrypts strings **in place** byte-by-byte:
@@ -195,5 +242,9 @@ After decrypting a staged container:
 - [5] [Deobfuscating Android Apps with Androidmeda: A Smarter Way to Read Obfuscated Code](https://www.mobile-hacker.com/2025/07/22/deobfuscating-android-apps-with-androidmeda-a-smarter-way-to-read-obfuscated-code/)
 - [6] [Androidmeda source code](https://github.com/In3tinct/Androidmeda)
 - [7] [Fake RTO Challan Checker Part 2: Cracking the Payload, Mapping the Operator, and Why This Is Worse Than I Thought](https://medium.com/@singhbkn07/fake-rto-challan-checker-part-2-cracking-the-payload-mapping-the-operator-and-why-this-is-3eb78e512d7f)
+- [8] [Fake mParivahan APK — original malware analysis and sample research](https://github.com/0x6773/mparivahan-apk-scam)
+- [9] [Android Open Source Project — Dalvik executable format](https://source.android.com/docs/core/runtime/dex-format)
+- [10] [dpt-shell — Android DEX protection shell source](https://github.com/luoyesiqiu/dpt-shell)
+- [11] [78 Victims, One Lazy Key, and a Firebase Named After India’s Ruling Party](https://medium.com/@singhbkn07/78-victims-one-lazy-key-and-a-firebase-named-after-indias-ruling-party-62cf0ad0380e)
 
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