diff --git a/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/accessibility-services-abuse.md b/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/accessibility-services-abuse.md
index 6bf2d5a383a..ac11d6ebbb7 100644
--- a/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/accessibility-services-abuse.md
+++ b/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/accessibility-services-abuse.md
@@ -40,6 +40,40 @@ This packing pattern (ATT&CK T1406.002) keeps the Accessibility module off-disk
 
 ---
 
+
+### Social-engineered sideloading lures (dropper stage)
+
+Some Accessibility RATs ship a **stage-1 dropper APK** that bundles the real implant (e.g., `payload.apk.xz`) plus **self-contained HTML pages** that mimic a trusted app-store update flow. Typical pattern:
+
+- Page 1 fakes a download + "security scan" to build trust.
+- Page 2 shows a fake Play Store listing with a green **UPDATE** button that triggers `REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES`.
+- Page 3 gives step-by-step instructions (with screenshots) to enable **"Allow from this source"**, completing sideloading.
+
+This is purely **social engineering**, but it is extremely effective at getting users to grant both the install permission and Accessibility access. It is often paired with **localised** HTML to match the victim language.
+
+### Fake Accessibility settings UI + silent permission escalation
+
+Instead of opening the real Accessibility settings screen, malware can display a **pixel-perfect clone** (custom Activity/WebView) where all strings are operator-controlled (title, section headers, enable button text, info message). When the victim taps **Enable**, they grant the malicious `AccessibilityService`. Immediately after that, the service can:
+
+- Navigate Settings via `AccessibilityService` APIs and **auto-grant dangerous permissions** (SMS, storage, notification listener, device admin).
+- **Auto-dismiss permission dialogs** before they are visible to the user (some builders expose a `hide_permission_process`-style toggle).
+
+If static tools refuse to extract `classes.dex` due to fake ZIP "encryption" flags, follow the **ZIP anti-reversing** workflow documented in [ZIP tricks](../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/zips-tricks.md) to recover the DEX first.
+
+### Post-extraction triage: plaintext base64 config in DEX
+
+After recovering `classes*.dex`, some implants store their full configuration as a **plain base64 blob** (no XOR/AES/string encryption). A quick triage loop:
+
+```bash
+# 1) find candidate blobs / tokens
+strings classes.dex | rg -n "OBL_|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{80,}={0,2}"
+
+# 2) decode the blob you found
+printf '%s' '<base64_blob>' | base64 -d
+```
+
+Decoded configs may include **C2 host/port**, operator tokens, UI strings for phishing screens, and runtime mode flags.
+
 ## Requesting the permission
 
 ```xml
@@ -327,5 +361,5 @@ Background and TTPs: https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/ghost-tap-new-cash-out-t
 * [Android accessibility documentation – Automating UI interaction](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/ui/accessibility/service)
 * [The Rise of RatOn: From NFC heists to remote control and ATS (ThreatFabric)](https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/the-rise-of-raton-from-nfc-heists-to-remote-control-and-ats)
 * [GhostTap/NFSkate – NFC relay cash-out tactic (ThreatFabric)](https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/ghost-tap-new-cash-out-tactic-with-nfc-relay)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
\ No newline at end of file
+* [Oblivion RAT - An Android Spyware Platform With a Built-In APK Factory](https://iverify.io/blog/oblivion-rat-android-spyware-analysis)
+{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}